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INTRODUCTION

Good government must avoid bad decisions. Because contemporary governments tend to undertake an ambitious range of social and
economic regulation, they can do tremendous damage by adopting
wasteful programs. Even casual observation reveals that some political
systems avoid improvident public policy choices more effectively than
others. Identifying institutional structures and processes that chronically produce bad decisions would both help explain why some regulatory regimes succeed where others fail, and illuminate useful reforms.
Over the last twenty years, the contemporary American administrative state has become acutely self-conscious about the nature and
extent of governmental policy failure. Commentators both in the
academy and in public circles identify a variety of ill-advised government programs, including ones that: achieve publicly beneficial outcomes, but at unnecessarily inflated cost;1 aim for one outcome and in
fact produce the opposite one; 2 relentlessly pursue relatively trivial
problems while ignoring far more substantial hazards; 3 and serve primarily to benefit discrete groups with no credible distributivejustice
claim to publicly funded beneficence. 4 There may be good reason to
question whether the "problem" of regulatory failure is as deep and
I

See ROBERT W. HAHN, REGULATORY REFORM: ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT'S NUMiBERS

14-23 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-6, 1999),
available at http://vv.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working-99-06.pdf.
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 407 (1990);
Robert A. Hillman, Legal Backfires (May 24, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Jeffrey Rachlinski).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMonents, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN. L. REV. 247, 257-60 (1996).
4
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 84-86 (1990); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229-44 (1989); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 452, 481-82 (2002).
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pervasive as some critics contend, 5 but virtually everyone agrees that
some appreciable segment of regulatory policy is socially counterproductive. Moreover, the concern that government frequently does
more harm than good resonates strongly with many "average" Americans. 6 Consequently, a search for the causes of governmental failure
often dominates public and academic discourse on the modern administrative state.
Many scholars and reformers identify human motivation as the
principal source of bad public policy decisions. 7 They import from
neoclassical economics the utility-maximizing rational man, and construct a model in which private actors engage in self-serving lobbying
efforts to persuade similarly self-serving government officials to enact
and execute policies that advance individual self-interest without regard to collective cost.8 Consequently, it is no surprise that public
programs do not reliably serve social goals. This school of thought is
generally referred to in legal scholarship as public choice theory. 9
For some public choice theorists, government is so suffused with
self-interested behavior that it is inescapably rotten to the core.' 0 Beginning from the premise that human actors are self-interested, these
scholars reach the conclusion that the only good government is less
government. Under this view, bad public policy decisions can be
5

See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
21-33 (1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING

INTRODUCTION

PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw 23-25 (1997); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The
Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648 (2001); see also Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 408-09 (arguing that empirical assessments of the performance of the
regulatory state are primitive and inconclusive).
6
See, e.g., PHILLIP K. HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); cf infranote 146 and accompanying text (discussing Americans' conflicting desire for, and suspicion of, government intervention).
7 See FARBER & FRICKE=, supra note 5, at 21-33.
8 See id, at 22-23.
9 The phrase "public choice theory" is a contentious label. Among political scientists
and economists, it may be used as synonymous (in whole or part) with styles of analysis that
go under the names of "rational choice theory" or "positive political theory." Not all of
those styles of analysis employ the motivational assumption (i.e., maximization of material
self-interest) described in the text. A prime example is the family of critiques of collective
decisionmaking based on the work of Kenneth Arrow. See generally MUELLER, supranote 4,
at 384-407 (reviewing Arrow's Theorem and related supporting and critical work). These
critiques assess the output of democratic processes without any assumptions about the public-regardingness of the participants' preferences. See id.
In legal scholarship, however, the dominant model used to critique regulatory government has prominently featured the rational, self-interest-maximizing actor. This sort of
analysis, often associated with the Chicago school of economics, is almost invariably what
legal scholars think of as public choice theory-although with the work of scholars like
Symposium participant David Spence, the meaning of "public choice theory" even in legal
scholarship may be expanding. See infra note 65. For further discussion of the motivational assumption in public choice theory, see infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
10 See FARBER & FRICKEy, supra note 5, at 16.
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avoided only by shrinking the quantum of pervertable public power
through radical deregulation, creating a minimalist night-watchman
state. 1
Although this view has influential proponents in law and legal
scholarship, 12 most scholars who employ public choice analysis have a
somewhat more optimistic perspective on government. They believe
that, at least in some circumstances, it is possible to co-opt individually
opportunistic behavior, so that self-interest-maximizing actors further
the collective good despite themselves.' 3 For these theorists, the goal
of those who design government institutions should be to discover
when and how individual self-serving desires can be channeled toward
public-serving ends.1 4 Whenever such channeling cannot be accomplished, institutional design should concentrate on curbing the damage that self-regarding public and private actors will wreak with
government power.' 5 By thus offering both a descriptive and a normative theory of government, public choice responds powerfully to
the need to understand why regulatory policymaking and execution
go wrong.
Nevertheless, public choice theory has both normative and descriptive problems. Many observers-including not only academic
commentators but also people who have held positions in government-resist the public choice account as overly cynical and simplistic. 16 They insist that those who serve in administrative agencies, the
White House, the courts, and Congress are often motivated by a sincere desire to pursue some conception of the public good.1 7 Critics
11

See, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT ExTRAcrION,

AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 170 (1997) ("The one unambiguous solution for reducing rent

extraction is reducing the size of the state itself and its power to threaten, expropriate, and
transfer."); MUELLER, supra note 4, at 245 ("[T]he best and simplest way to avoid the rentseeking problem is to avoid establishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the regulations and regulatory agencies that lead to rent seeking.").
12
See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 11; Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703 (1984).
13
See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 3-5 (2000) (arguing that constitutions are best viewed as ways of
channeling private interest); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing same in the
context of legislation).
14 See FARBER & FRcKEY, supra note 5, at 11.
15 SeeJonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutoly Interpretation:An Interest Group Mode4 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 225-27 (1986).
16
See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47-71 (1994); RCHARD L. HALL,
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS

157-61 (1996); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:A Skeptical

Look at the Theoreticaland "Empirical"Practice
of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199,
217-23 (1988); AbnerJ. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988); see also MAsHAW, supra
note 5, at 25-27 (reviewing arguments); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 5, at 33 (same).
17
See Mikva, supra note 16, at 167.
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can point to a number of public-spirited governmental programs, typically in the environmental and civil rights areas, that are difficult to
explain using public choice premises.' 8 Furthermore, several empirical studies suggest that public officials often make choices that are
more consistent with their ideological beliefs than their self-interests. 19 Finally, both political philosophers and public administrators
worry that widespread devotion to a cynical theory of government can
become a self-fulfilling prophesy. 20 If the dominant cultural story is
that government primarily serves private ends rather than the public
good, then citizens have no reason to regard their government as anything other than illegitimate and contemptible, while public officials
have no reason to regard their time in office as anything other than
an opportunity to feather their own nests.
Still, it takes a theory to beat a theory.2 1 The notion that bad
government decisions happen randomly is both descriptively unlikely
and theoretically unacceptable. Public choice offers a parsimonious
theory that, its proponents believe, explains and predicts the situations that lead to such failure. Its ambitious explanatory agenda has
clearly contributed to its influence on law. What can those who seek a
less relentlessly cynical theory of human civic behavior offer as an alternative to account for the admittedly bad choices that governments
sometimes make?
We contend that bad public policy can often be traced to flaws in
human judgment and choice among governmental actors.2 2 Aligning
and channeling self-interest toward pursuing the public interest will
not guarantee good policy outcomes. Regulatory programs that arise
from both good and ill intentions often fail to accomplish their intended goals. Governmental actors can make mistaken choices that,
18 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedurein EnvironmentalLaw, 8J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 59 (1992); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal EnvironmentalRegulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 542-43 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, Against
(andfor) Madison:An Essay in PraiseofFactions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 553, 565-66 (1997);
see also MAsHAw, supra note 5, at 33-34 (discussing such programs).
19 See FAWER & FucKEY, supra note 5, at 24-25, 28-33 (reviewing this evidence).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 213-17.
21 As Jon Macey observed in a critique of Jerry Mashaw's Greed, Chaos, & Governance.

In the social sciences, theories survive until a competing theory more accurately rationalizes the real-world phenomena the theories were designed to

describe.
From this perspective, it is difficult to know what to make of Professor
Mashaw's plea not to take public choice too seriously. He offers no alternative theory with which to replace the doctrine he criticizes.
Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Legal Academy, 86 GEO. LJ. 1075, 1076 (1998)
(reviewing MAsHAW, supra note 5).
22
Others have traced bad policy to cognitive errors made by the public. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060-61 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between cognitive errors and regulatory mistakes).
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despite the best of intentions, produce improvident policy.23 Essentially, we argue that self-interest is not the only, and perhaps not even
the primary, reason that good government programs go bad. Rather,
we propose, poor decisions are often the result of fallibility rather
than culpability.
Fallibility, however, is not a sufficient foundation on which to
construct a theory of government failure unless mistaken judgment
24
can be reliably modeled and, at least in broad patterns, predicted.
We begin such a process here. Relying on insights from cognitive psychology, we identify categories of errors that regularly inhere in
human decisionmaking. Psychologists have found that identifiable
circumstances can lead people to make bad choices. To the extent
that the structures and processes of government put decisionmakers
in such circumstances, the odds of bad policy increase. Wasteful government, we contend, often occurs because people with good motives
are in positions that facilitate, or at least fail to counteract, bad judgment. As a corollary, good public policy is most likely to result when
governmental actors operate within decisionmaking institutions structured to reduce the incidence of judgmental errors.
The public choice model of government is therefore incomplete.
A key lesson of cognitive psychology is that even people with good
motives tend to make bad choices in certain, predictable circumstances. Identifying those circumstances is at least as significant to diagnosing public policy failures as is focusing on the motives of key
regulatory actors. Attending to the influence of cognitive errors facilitates an understanding of why some governmental structures are generally successful while others persistently fail. Without such attention
to the institutions and practices of regulatory decisionmaking, even
programs conceived with the purest motives and executed by the most
selfless and professional staffs may be plagued by inefficient and
counterproductive outcomes.
This Article articulates and defends our thesis. First, we outline
the cognitive psychological theory of human decisionmaking and its
applicability to governmental actors. Part II sketches out and contrasts the public choice model of governmental error with a psychological model. In Part III, we discuss both the descriptive and
normative implications of the two models. Part IV summarizes the
23
Our argument necessarily implies that government programs motivated by socially
wasteful goals may also fail to accomplish their desired ends, making them doubly flawed.
24
Some scholars have made efforts in this regard in the particular area of comparing
the performance of courts and agencies as risk regulators. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990); Peter Huber,

Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 277 (1985); Roger G. Noll &James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990).
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relative merits of the contrasting theories. Finally, we offer some concluding thoughts on why the choice of model for government error
matters.
I
HUMAN JUDGMENT AND
A.

CHOICE

The Basic Cognitive Model

Over the past thirty years, cognitive psychologists have created a
well-developed model of humanjudgment and choice. 25 Basic principles of this model have begun to inform legal scholarship. 2 6 Those
principles are well described by others, and only a brief review is
needed here.
The core premise of cognitive psychological theory is an understanding that the human brain is a limited information processor that
cannot possibly manage successfully all of the stimuli crossing its
perceptual threshold.2 7 The complexity of many tasks exceeds the
brain's capacity to process information, and as a result decisionmakers
are bound to make mistakes.2 8 Nevertheless, people effectively negotiate their environments most of the time. 2 9 To perform as well as they
do in day-to-day living, humans must allocate their scarce cognitive
resources efficiently. They must ignore information that is not important, and attend closely to information that is. Good decisionmaking
by government officials similarly requires learning to allocate scarce
cognitive resources well.
Psychologists have found that people rely on two primary strategies to make the most of their cognitive abilities. First, they rely on
mental shortcuts, which psychologists call heuristics. 30 These shortcuts consist largely of simple rules of thumb that facilitate rapid, almost reflexive, information processing. Second, people rely on
organizing principles, which psychologists call schema, to process information. 3 1 These schema consist of a scripted set of default information and organizational themes that help people focus on the
25 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Te "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Citics, Skeptics, and
CautiousSupporters, 85 COP.NELL L. REv. 739, 743-45 (2000).
26 See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
27 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On thw Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 583 (1996).
28 Id.
29

See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART

(1999) (discussing the advantages of relying on heuristics).
30 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1124, 1124 (1974).
31

1991).

SusAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 97-99, 136-39 (2d ed.
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information most likely to be relevant, thereby allowing them to ignore information likely to be irrelevant.
Reliance on heuristics and schema allows people to process an
amazing array of complex stimuli efficiently. These devices serve people well most of the time, but can lead to systematic errors in judgment, which psychologists often refer to as "cognitive illusions."3 2 For
example, when making judgments about the frequency of events, people often rely on the ease with which an instance of a target event can
be called to mind-a process that psychologists call the "availability
heuristic." 33 Although useful, the availability heuristic can also systematically skew judgment in circumstances in which ease of recollection
does not correspond to actual frequency.3 4 As a consequence of relying on this heuristic, people often overestimate the frequency of disasters, such as airplane crashes, that tend to get extra attention from the
35
news media.
Like heuristics, cognitive schema facilitate good judgment most
of the time, but can lead people astray.3 6 For example, in a fancy
restaurant when a well-dressed person walks over to the table with
leather-bound folders, most people will, without thinking, recognize
that person as the waiter coming to hand out menus. Prior experience with the setting conveys the expectations and cues that facilitate
this conclusion without further processing, thereby allowing people to
devote their limited cognitive resources to other tasks,3 7 such as continuing their conversation with their dinner companion. Once again,
however, reliance on schema can lead to problems; in fact, psychologists attribute racial prejudice to the brain's reliance on schema.38
Furthermore, schema can be misleading. For example, the class
of phenomena that cognitive psychologists call "framing effects" can

32 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 27, at 584. The reference to illusions is meant
as a direct analogy to perceptual illusions, which arise from patterned ways of processing
visual information: Just as a brain gets used to the presence of certain cues to depth perception, and thereby can get fooled by some arrangements of these cues, so it can be
fooled by cognitive illusions. See id. at 583-84; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 30,
at 1124 ("In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe
and systematic errors.").
33 Tversky & Kahneman, supra, note 30, at 1127.
34 Id. at 1127-28.
35 See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceived Risk, in JUDGIMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURis-rICS AND BIASEs 463, 467-68 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); see also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683, 706-07 (1999) (arguing that this heuristic creates errors in the general
public's perception of risk).
36 See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 31, at 97.
37 Id. at 97, 119.
38
See id. at 132-33.
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be attributed to schema. 39 Framing effects are the tendency to treat
potential gains differently from potential losses.40 Notably, people
make risk-averse decisions in the face of potential gains and risk-seeking decisions in the face of potential losses. 4 1 These effects result
from the tendency to associate different problem-solving strategies for
gains than for losses.4 2 Specifically, people associate risks involving
gains with risk-averse decisionmaking strategies. 43 Because "a bird in
the hand is worth two in the bush," people prefer a certain receipt of
fifty dollars to a fifty-percent chance of winning one hundred dollars.
By contrast, people are used to struggling to avoid any losses, and so
find themselves attracted to gambles that involve the possibility of losing nothing: People prefer a fifty-percent chance of losing one hundred dollars to a certain loss of fifty dollars because the first prospect
includes the possibility of losing nothing. The structure of the problem invokes a different set of associations and imagery when described
as involving gains than when described as involving losses, even
though most decisions can be characterized in either way.
For example, consider the well-known "Asian flu vaccine" prob44
lem that Tversky and Kahneman used to illustrate framing effects.
Tversky and Kahneman asked people to suppose that the United
States "is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people." They then ask people to choose
between two programs "to combat the disease," one of which saves two
hundred people for sure and the other has a one-third chance of saving all six hundred people (and a two-thirds chance of saving none).
When the problem presents the choices as lives saved, people tend to
prefer the sure option; when it presents the choices as lives lost, people tend to prefer the riskier option. Although either choice is normatively defensible, changing preferences with frame is not, inasmuch
as the frame is entirely arbitrary. The gains frame highlights the fact
that the less risky option saves two hundred people, making it seem
like the sensible choice. By contrast, the loss frame highlights the fact
39 See Daniel Kahneman, Preface to CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, at ix, xiii-xvi
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
40

See id. at xiv.

41

Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Asi. PSYCHOLO-

GISt 341, 342-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECoNomNrxuc 263, 268-69 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions, 59J. Bus. S251, S257-S260 (1986);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Thw Framingof Decisionsand the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE (n.s.) 453, 453-55 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, The Psychology of
Choice).
42 Tversky & Kahneman, The Psychology of Choice, supra note 41, at 454.
43 Id. at 453.
44 The example is taken from Tversky & Kahneman, The Psychology of Choice, supra
note 41, at 453.
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that the less risky option results in four hundred deaths, making it
seem unattractive. In short, the different descriptions lead people to
think differently about the problem.
Thus, although heuristics and schema are essential to negotiating
an information-saturated environment, they come at the cost of systematic errors in judgment. People sometimes use heuristics that are
inappropriate for the task at hand. Relying on cognitive availability to
assess the likelihood of a disaster, for example, leads to an inaccurate
assessment of the underlying threat. Similarly, people are often unaware that a particular schema is affecting their assessment of a problem. Failing to recognize that a decision can be characterized as a
gain or as a loss, for example, limits the way in which people think
about risky prospects.
B.

The Role of Expertise in Decisionmaking

Governments, of course, do not rely exclusively on ordinary, inexperienced decisionmakers; they rely, to a great extent, on experts.
Consequently, determining the relative strengths and weaknesses of
lay and expert decisionmaking is fundamental to designing processes
that minimize the damage cognitive limitations will wreak on a society's ability to govern itself wisely. Indeed, the choice between expert
and lay decisionmaking may be the most crucial design decision to be
made in a government engaged in extensive social and economic
regulation.
Experts clearly have advantages over laypersons in decisionmaking. By virtue of their training and experience, they obviously have
more knowledge. By itself, however, knowledge is not enough; in fact,
extra information feeds certain prevalent cognitive illusions. 45 For example, in one study, expert analysts estimated that the likelihood of "a
dramatic increase in oil prices and a 30% drop in the consumption of
oil in the United States" was greater than the likelihood of "a 30%
drop in the consumption of oil in the United States." 46 The greater
detail in the former event made it seem more likely (an example of
the phenomenon that psychologists call the "representativeness
heuristic") .47
If experts rely on heuristics that lead them astray, the extra
knowledge they bring to a problem may become useless, even
counterproductive. Thus, at least as important as knowledge is an
awareness of judgmental pitfalls that are common to the types of
45 Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental
Analysis, 97J. POL. ECON. 1232 (1989).
46 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The
Conjunction Fallacy in ProbabilityJudgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 293, 308 (1983).
47

See id.
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problems experts encounter. Only if experts also develop decisionmaking competence to complement their knowledge can they reliably
make better decisions than lay persons.
Experts have two opportunities for developing such decisionmaking competence that are typically unavailable to lay decisionmakers:
experience and training. By repeatedly making the same types of decisions, experts encounter the same problems and often (although
not always) obtain useful feedback on their mistakes. Experience accompanied by feedback allows experts to identify situations in which
they are using inappropriate heuristics or are trapped by misleading
schema. Thus, experts can develop different ways of thinking about
frequently encountered problems when previous ways of thinking are
not producing desirable results.
Furthermore, experience with decisionmaking, even without
good feedback, can be helpful. Psychologists have noted that when
people perceive a problem as unique-a one-of-a-kind judgment
call-they tend to rely on intuition and mental shortcuts that lead
them astray. 48 For example, psychologists have found that people
often express an overconfidence in their ability to answer trivia questions; when people say that they are 95% confident in their answer to
a question; they are generally right about 85% of the time. 49 At the
same time, however, people have a fairly accurate sense of how many
questions they can answer correctly in a set of questions. 50 Determining one's confidence in ability to answer a trivia question as an isolated instance increases vulnerability to cognitive error, whereas
seeing it as part of a set leads to an accurate assessment. Seeing a
problem as one of a type of problems generally leads to less reliance
on misleading thought processes and more accurate decisionmaking.
Experience thus facilitates what psychologists call "stepping
outside" of a decisionmaking problem to assess decisionmaking strategies. 51 Experienced decisionmakers have had more of an opportunity
to evaluate how they make decisions. With feedback, they can determine when the mental strategies upon which they rely produce positive results. Even without feedback, experienced decisionmakers
acquire the ability to see commonalities across problems and to recognize new relationships between the characteristics of a problem and a
sensible choice.

48

See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive

Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGxrr. Sci. 17, 23 (1993).
49
See Slovic et al., supra note 35, at 473.
50 See Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive IllusionsDisappear:Beyond "Heuristicsand
Biases," 2 Eu. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 83 (1991) (reviewing this research).
51
See Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 48, at 23.

560
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Furthermore, experts have training in how to make decisions.
Over time, professions tend to develop adaptations to cognitive limitations that impair professional judgment.5 2 For example, a number of
cognitive biases make it difficult for civil engineers to identify precisely the necessary degree of structural support for a building. 53 Nevertheless, very few buildings collapse as a result of lack of structural
support. The reason is that norms of good civil engineering practice
call for building in much more structural support than appears necessary, as a safety precaution. 54 Without even identifying cognitive limitations as the problem, civil engineers have managed to develop an
adaptation that keeps those limitations from producing disastrous
consequences.
Even with these advantages over lay decisionmakers, however, experts can still fall prey to illusions of judgment. The psychological
literature is replete with case studies of erroneous or foolish expert
judgments. 55 Feedback that experts receive may be biased, or subject
to biased interpretation, thereby making it difficult for individuals and
56
their professions to learn from past mistakes.
More significantly, expertise introduces its own biases. Notably,
experts tend to be overconfident about their decisions. Experts are
"often wrong but rarely in doubt. '5 7 People in general tend to overestimate their own abilities in areas about which they believe themselves
to have some greater-than-average knowledge. This tendency is more
pronounced in experts, who also tend to have great faith that their
profession has identified most of the problems they are likely to face
and equipped them with the ability to surmount these problems.
Moreover, experts may myopically focus on issues within their area of
expertise and thereby fail to recognize that a decision would benefit
from accessing other bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking. 58 Expertise produces a useful set of schema to guide decisionmaking, but
like all schema, they limit a decisionmaker's ability to think differently
about a problem and to recognize the limitations inherent in the
schema. In short, the mental shortcuts that experts use produce more
accurate results than those upon which laypersons rely, but experts
are less likely to question whether they have made a good decision.
52 See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How OrganizationalPractices Can Compensate
for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 2-3 (1998).
53 Id. at 4.
54

55

Id.

See Slovic et al., supra note 35, at 475-78.
See RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 97-101 (1980).
57 Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinantsof Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992).
58 See Slovic et al., supra note 35, at 477.
56

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

2002]

Thus, although experts often have knowledge, experience, and
training that protect them from some serious errors that plague the
lay decisionmaker, they are still predictably fallible. Experts in many
situations do not receive reliable feedback, which inhibits their opportunity to learn from experience. Additionally, they tend to be overconfident in their judgments, placing too much faith in their abilities.
Therefore, expertise can have similar consequences to heuristics in
laypersons: clearly useful, but dangerous if overused.
C.

The Role of Institutional Design in Avoiding Decisionmaking
Traps

When decisions are made in an organizational setting-the typical practice in modern regulatory government-institutional design
can counter the effect of cognitive limitations. Of particular interest
to regulatory policymaking, organizations can be structured to optimize the benefits and costs of expert decisionmaking.
One such structural choice involves putting experts with certain
kinds of knowledge and experience in charge of some aspects of the
decision, and different kinds of experts in charge of other aspects.
For example, banks separate the people who make decisions on primary loans from those who work with loans in default.59 The first
group tends to develop social connections and cognitive attachments
to the borrower that can cloud judgment about whether and when to
foreclose. Indeed, psychologists have identified a strong tendency in
businesspeople to throw good money after bad ("escalating commitment").60 By transferring the management of a loan from the initial
lender to a workout specialist, banks avoid the error introduced by
escalating commitment and obtain a fresh perspective on the questions whether, and how long, to give the borrower a chance to work
through a difficult period.
Furthermore, a group of experts can be subjected to a set of
ground rules for decisionmaking that reduce the effects of cognitive
errors. For example, after suffering the consequences of poor decisionmaking by his national security team in the Bay of Pigs incident,
President Kennedy redefined how his team would operate. In the Bay
of Pigs invasion, Kennedy's advisors had quickly coalesced around an
initial strategy towards Cuba, without considering alternatives. 61 Once
they convinced themselves that this strategy was sound, they became
59

4 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 33.06[5][a], at 33-59

(2001) (discussing separation of lending and workout groups in real estate loans).
60
Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Aluddy: A Study of EscalatingCommitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. PERFORMA4NCE 27 (1976).
61

See IRVING

L. JANIs,

GROUFTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND

FIASCOES 139-42 (2d ed. 1982).
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overconfident about its success, making wild assumptions about how
the plan would operate. When the Cuban Missile Crisis arose, Kennedy arranged different procedural rules. He divided his decisionmakers into different groups of experts and appointed his brother
as a "devil's advocate." This arrangement forced his advisors continually to critique and defend their assumptions and to consider creative
alternative responses to the crisis.
D.

Summary of the Psychological Model

The portrait psychologists paint of human judgment is one of
constant effort to stretch limited cognitive resources. At an individual
level, people develop heuristics to enable them to manage the stimuli
they encounter; these heuristics serve them well, but lead to systematic
errors. Experts have knowledge, training, and experience that enable
them to identify situations in which they cannot trust ordinary heuristics, and to approach problems from a different perspective. These
advantages can indeed produce better decisions than laypeople make,
but can also lead to overconfidence and a failure adequately to consider alternatives beyond the boundaries of their expertise.
In light of this, a government that seeks to avoid bad decisions
must be structured carefully to avoid predictable errors in judgment.
The psychological model ofjudgment and choice provides both a normative and a positive framework for assessing public policymaking
structures. Experts are essential to complex decisions, but must be
relied upon for their knowledge while reined in for their confidence.
To the extent that a policymaking structure relies on lay judgments
that are likely to be erroneous, fails to provide experts with unbiased
feedback to which they must attend, or allows expert overconfidence
to go unchecked, it will produce poor decisions.
II
Two MODELS OF GOVERNMENTAL ERROR

Against this background, it becomes possible to identify two con-

trasting accounts of why bad regulatory policy occurs: The (familiar)
public choice model and the (novel) psychological model. As subpart
A describes, public choice theorists worry that government decisionmaking is the product of self-interest: most immediately, the self-interest of the people who occupy public office; derivatively, the selfinterest of the individuals and groups who can deliver votes, campaign
contributions, and lucrative private-sector employment. The regulatory policy generated through such a system will further the collective
good only by happy chance-or, perhaps, if extraordinarily acute institutional design can channel the energetic pursuit of self-interest to-
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ward public-regarding goals and dissipate whatever self-serving energy
cannot be so diverted.
Psychological theory generates a novel account of undesirable
government decisionmaking. As subpart B explains, psychologists
worry that cognitive limitations of the human brain tend to produce
bad choices in precisely the sort of circumstances in which much regulatory policy is formulated. The goal of institutional design in this
account is not to trick or defeat selfish human instinct but rather to
correct, or at least minimize, flawed human judgment.
A.

The Public Choice Model of Governmental Policy Failure

As others have noted, 62 public choice is not a neatiy unitary theory. Common to all analyses labeled "public choice" is the core concept, taken from economic thought, of instrumental rationality: The
individual will order his behavior so as to maximize the likelihood of
achieving his individually defined goals. 63 Some public choice theorists make no further motivational assumptions. Such accounts, usefully dubbed "thin-rational[ity]" models byJohn Ferejohn, 64 refuse to
specify the kinds of goals the individual pursues. For these theoristsexemplified by the work of Symposium participant David Spence 65the analysis can proceed without regard to whether individuals are
motivated by self-interest, selflessness, or some shifting combination of
the two. We do not consider here either the theoretical defensibility
or prescriptive utility of such accounts. 66 Although thin-rationality accounts flourish in (and perhaps dominate) the contemporary public
choice analyses of political scientists and economists, 67 they have been
the exception rather than the norm in legal scholarship.
62 E.g., FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 5, at 6, 12-13; GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 16,
at 13-30; Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction:Economic Approaches to Politics, in THE RATIONAL
CHOICE CONTRovERSY. ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED 1, 1-2 (Jeffrey Fried-

man ed., 1996).
63 See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 14; MAsHAW, supra note 5, at 11; Edward L.
Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater,
but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 313-14 (2002).
64 John Ferejohn, Rationali and Interpretation: ParliamentaryElections in Early Stuart
England, in THE ECONO.Mic APPROACH TO POLrICS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ACrIoN 279, 282 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991); see also GREEN &
SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 17-18 (discussing Ferejohn's models); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Explanationsfor EnvironmentalLaws, 1969-73,
9 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 39 (1998) (same).
65 See David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 397
(2002); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State, 89
GEO. LJ. 97 (2000).
66 For such an assessment, see GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 18, 33-46 (methodological critique); Rubin, supra note 63 (epistemological critique).
67 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, StructuringLawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A CriticalView, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616, 618-21 (2002); Terry M. Moe, Cynicism
and PoliticalTheory, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 362, 369 (2002). But see GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra
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Here, we focus on what has been the paradigmatic public choice
theory of legal analyses. This account adds to the assumption of instrumental rationality the further assumption that the goal of human
actors is advancing individual material self-interest. Apparently-for
the point is rarely discussed explicitly-there is a range of views about
whether this motivational assumption of universal self-interest is a
heuristic rather than an assertion of fact.68 For present purposes, it
makes no difference whether the public choice account rests on the
descriptive conclusion that self-interest really is the exclusive human
motivation, or on the prescriptive judgment that analysis of government institutions should proceed as ifthis were so.
1.

Congress

The legislature is the governmental institution that historically
has received most attention from economic theorists. In the public
choice account, the primary goal of legislators is to maintain their position, i.e., to get reelected. 69 Ancillary objectives may include increasing the power of their office or achieving higher office.
To ensure reelection, the rational legislator will produce bills that
transfer resources from the public fisc, or from some discrete group,
to his electoral constituency. 70 Because the self-interest-maximizing
voters back home will not be impressed by legislative results that benefit them only to the same extent as all (or most) other citizens, the
rational legislator understands that he must deliver legislation that offers his constituents benefits relatively greater than those gained by all
note 16, at 19 ("Much of the [political science] rational choice literature rests on unambiguously thick-rational assumptions."); cf Friedman, supra note 62, at 21 n.1 (arguing that
many ostensibly thin-rationality economic analyses in fact slip into thick-rationality
assumptions).
68 See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 5, at 25-26 (discussing, inter alia, Brennan and
Buchanan's statement that "'[w]e model man as a wealth maximizer, not because this
model is necessarily the most descriptive empirically, but because we seek a set of rules that
will work well independently of the behavioral postulates introduced'" (quoting Geoffrey
Brennan &James M. Buchanan, "IsPublic ChoiceImmoral?" The Casefor the 'Nobel'Lie,74 VA.
L. REV. 179, 188 (1988)). See generally GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 20-32 (comparing various theoretical approaches).
69
See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 121-22 (1974);
Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theoiy of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46-49 (1988); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional
Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences ofJudicialDeference to Legislatures, 74
VA. L. REV. 373, 396 (1988); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospectsfor FormalModels of Legislatures,10
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 12-13 (1985); Barbara Sinclair, PurposiveBehavior in the U.S. Congress: A
Review Essay, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 117, 118 (1983). See generally FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 5,
at 21-24 (explaining the economic theory of legislation).
70
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
Amx. L. REV. 23, 34-36, 84-86 (1995); Macey, supra note 15, at 230-32; Sam Peltzman,
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27J.L. & ECON. 181, 192-206 (1984); Barry R_
Weingast et al., The PoliticalEconomy of Benefits and Costs: A NeoclassicalApproach to Distributive
Politics, 89J. POL.ECON. 642 (1981).
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(or most) others. Similarly, he must resist legislation that would impose perceptible costs on his constituents to achieve widely shared
benefits.
Even more important than the typical voter-who faces signifi-

cant information costs in monitoring the legislator's actions, and for
whom the act of voting per se is of problematic rationality-are interest groups. 71 These groups can finance his reelection bid and, possibly, mobilize a bloc of voters by alerting them to the legislator's efforts
on their behalf. He will procure the support of groups both by offer-

ing legislation that benefits them at the expense of competing groups
or the public as a whole, and by threatening legislation that imposes
costs on them for the benefit of competing groups or the public as a
whole.
2.

The Courts

Unlike the clear incentive structure of legislative behavior, judi72
cial behavior has been more difficult for public choice to model.

Many American judges-and, most important for regulatory government, all federal judges-face no significant risk of losing their office,
or even of suffering a diminution in compensation or status. In systems in which the judiciary is constantly dependent on politicians for
access to more desirable assignments and positions, the rational judge
will procure support by rendering decisions that favor the party in
power. 73 In the federal system, however, appointment is for life, the
perquisites of office are fairly constant, and advancement, although
dependent upon the favor of the President and the Senate, is a rela-

tively rare opportunity.
Hence, the rational federal judge has no significant incentive to

render decisions that favor a particular geographical or political con71 See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 11, at 133-56; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q(-. ECON. 371, 371-73 (1983); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); Macey, supra note 15, at 231-32; GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MG,,rr. Sci. 3, 11-12 (1971); Robert D. Tollison,
Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988). See generally FARBER & FRIEY, supra
note 5, at 23-24 (discussing interest group models).
72 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PuzzLE OFJUDIcIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Jonathan R. Macey,
CompetingEconomic Views of the Constitution,56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 50, 70 (1987); Richard L.
Revesz, CongressionalInfluence on JudicialBehavior? An EmpiricalExamination of Challenges to
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1100 (2001).
73 See, for example, the work of Professors Ramseyer and Rasmusen on the Japanese
judiciary: J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, JudicialIndependence in a Civil Law Regime:
The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 259 (1997); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B.
Rasmusen, Why Are JapaneseJudges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 Am!. POL.
Sci. REV. 331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is theJapanese Conviction
Rate So High?, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001);J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the
Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999).
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stituency, or that procure (through solicitation or extortion) the support of interest groups.7 4 As a corollary, he has little incentive to
expand the authority of the judiciary. Relatively independent of external public and private actors, he does not need to create opportunities to bargain for their support; indeed, authority-enlarging
75
decisions may undesirably increase his workload.
3.

The President

The Presidency initially played a very subsidiary role in public
choice theorizing, modeled only sketchily and largely as an adjunct to
the legislative process. 76 However, with the rise of interest in the "Unitary Executive" conception of how government power should be allocated, the President has emerged as a key actor in public choice
analyses of public policymaking institutions. 77
Like legislators, the rational president is motivated by the desire
for reelection and, as a corollary, for expansion of the authority of his
office. Significantly, however, his constituency is the entire nation.
His actions are easier for voters to monitor than are the actions of any
74
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 15, at 263-64; see a/soJonathan R. Macey, SeparatedPowers
and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. LJ. 671,
675-92 (1992). This standard public choice account of independence from political
forces has been challenged. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 60-65 (arguing that federal judges are regionally and geographically biased toward state and local preferences);
Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Casefor Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV.
1243, 1314-22 (1999) (arguing that judicial review favors special interests); Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJustify More IntrusiveJudicial Review, 101 YALE LJ. 31
(1991) (same).
75
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 117-20 (1995) (considering such
factors as salary, leisure-seeking, reputation, prestige, and reversal avoidance as part of the
'Judicial utility function"); cf Neil S. Siegel, Sen and the Hart ofJurisprudence:A Critique of the
Economic Analysis ofJudicialBehavior, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1999).
76
See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 1-2; see a/soJoseph A. Pika, Interest Groups: A Doubly
DynamicRelationship, in PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING: AN END-OF-CENTURY ASSESSMENT 59, 59
(Steven A. Shull ed., 1999) (noting that while "[i] nterest groups have long been viewed as
an integral part of the congressional and bureaucratic policymaking processes," their significance in presidential action has only recently been recognized).
77
The Unitary Executive conception insists that control over the execution of all federal law (and, in particular, regulatory statutes) should be centralized exclusively in the
President. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 31-33. As a corollary, it employs an expansive conception of "execution" that comprises all activity implementing a statute after completion of the lawmaking process. Its principle remedial prescription (the precise details
of which vary with the particular advocate) is eliminating all formal barriers of "independence" between the President and agency officials exercising policymaking authority. See,
e.g., id. at 82-85.
The Unitary Executive concept is typically justified as the best interpretation of the
original intent of Article II, but the constitutional argument is often buttressed by pragmatic claims that centralized presidential control will yield superior regulatory policy along
a variety of dimensions. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple
Rulesfor a Complex World, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989-991 (1997) (collecting and reviewing these claims).
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single legislator. Thus, it will be more difficult for him to deliver, undetected, public policy that benefits particular groups or geographical
areas at public expense. Analogously, interest groups will find it far
more difficult and costly to purchase compliant presidential behavior
78
than to strike a mutually beneficial deal with individual legislators.
All of this, of course, applies only to first-term presidents. The
behavior of the second-term president is harder to model because,
like the federal judiciary, he exists outside the familiar incentive
framework of reelection. Public choice thus far has not significantly
explored the extent to which the second-term president perceives his
self-interest to be aligned with the success of his party in retaining the
Presidency. If that were the case, second-term presidents would behave much like first-term ones. Also largely unexplored is the question of how the rational second-term president uses his office to
enhance his position after leaving office. 79 Although some theorists
assert that presidents, once reelected, are motivated primarily to build
reputational capital so as to secure "their place in history,"80 the sort
of behavior that furthers this goal remains largely unspecified.
4. Administrative Agencies
Finally, public choice has generated a fairly detailed model of administrative agency behavior.8 1 The rational administrator will act to
78 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 34-35; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Frank H. Easter-

brook, UnitaryExecutive Interpretation:A Commen4 15 GARDozo L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 93-106 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 Caumozo L. REv. 201, 212-18 (1993); Moe & Wilson,
supra note 76, at 11.

79 This appears to be fertile ground for public choice analysis. A new range of employment opportunities for former presidents has been opened by the Carlyle Group, a
private equity firm whose clientele are the very rich seeking global investment prospects.
See Leslie Wayne, Elder Bush in Big G.O.P. Cast Toilingfor Top Equity Firm, N.Y. Ti. Es, Mar. 5,
2001, at Al (reporting former President Bush's meetings with top Saudi and Korean officials on behalf of Carlyle's ventures in those countries, activity that falls outside the scope
of U.S. ethics restrictions).
80 Moe & Wilson, supra note 76, at 11-13.
81 See, e.g., PETER H. ARANSON, AMERICAN GovERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE (1981);
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVXIDENCE (Andr6 Blais & St6phane
Dion eds., 1991); WILLIAM A. NIsKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); GEORGEJ. STIGLER, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?, in THE CITZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 178 (1975); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-

SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of

Legislative Delegation,68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 37-62 (1982); Edna Earle VassJohnson, Agency
"Capture" The "RevolvingDoor" Between Regulated Industries and Their RegulatingAgencies, 18
U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J.L.
& ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. &
MGmT. Sci. 335 (1974). See generally MAsHAw, supra note 5, at 118-19, 140-42 (summarizing this work); Steven P. Croley, PublicInterested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 9-15
(2000) (explaining the role of interest group theory).
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maintain his position and to expand the authority of his agency. To
the extent he is not a career administrator, he will also work to ensure
lucrative employment opportunities on leaving government.
In pursuit of these goals, he will make alliances with influential
politicians (especially in congressional oversight committees) and procure the support of interest groups using the same basic strategies employed by legislators. Where agency officials differ from Congress is
their ability to accomplish the goal of expanding institutional authority. Although legislatureshave the incentive to expand their authority
so as to increase opportunities for members to extract reelection support, legislatorsface a collective action problem when they attempt to
do so: No individual legislator has an incentive to spend time, energy,
and political capital on activities that will benefit all members equally.
Agencies, having a more hierarchical structure, avoid this problem.
The agency head can mobilize subordinate staff in efforts to expand
the agency's budget or jurisdiction or both, thus consolidating both
the costs and benefits of such an effort into one institutional structure. 82 Subordinate staff will engage in these efforts even though the
civil service system substantially removes the risk ofjob loss. They also
have an individual interest in augmenting the authority and importance of the agency. In addition, they may work to advance the goals
of senior agency officials who control access to upgrades in their compensation and status.
5.

The Reasonsfor, and General Strategies Against, Bad Public
Policy

In the public choice account, the most important source of bad
government decisions is self-interest. Private interest groups lobby for
regulatory policies that advance the material well-being of their members-at best without regard to whether these policies serve the larger
public interest, and often with the precise object of profiting at the
expense of the public or some competing group. These groups work
primarily through the institution most vulnerable to their efforts: the
legislature.
The legislature's vulnerability stems directly from its members'
need for periodic reelection, and derivatively from the geographical
base of the franchise. 83 The smaller the size of the constituency whose
support must be obtained, the greater the likelihood that the legislator will work to produce legislation that decreases overall welfare.
Thus, the House of Representatives is the most likely source of subop82

See THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE, supra note 81;

NISC ANEN, supra note 81, at 197.
83
See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note

of electoral base).

70, at 58-60 (relying heavily on geographical nature
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timal public policy, as its members scramble to produce locally beneficial programs underwritten by the public fisc ("pork") and to block
any measures that impose discernable local costs in the process of producing widely shared benefits. Given the House's two-year election
cycle, the process of procuring campaign contributions and currying
local voter support is virtually constant. The Senate's six-year election
cycle moderates this pressure somewhat, but the need to appeal to the
voters of a single state creates a similar policy bias in favor of discrete
geographical interests relative to the national welfare.
The perceived inverse relationship between size of constituency
and production of nationally optimal regulatory policy leads some
public choice theorists to prefer a strict textualist approach to interpreting legislation.8 4 Legislative history is often drafted by small
groups of legislators, perhaps even at the subcommittee level, that are
especially vulnerable to capture by self-serving interest groups. By enforcing only the language upon which the entire Congress could
agree, courts provide at least marginally greater assurance that statutes will advance broadly beneficial policies rather than particular private-interest-favoring deals.
Agencies, dependent upon Congress for budgetary and jurisdictional aggrandizement, will respond to the preferences of influential
legislators, thus carrying regional and interest-group-favoring biases
into the regulatory process. 8 5 These biases become further entrenched as agencies develop mutually beneficial relationships with
certain interest groups (e.g., "capture") that advance the immediate
and long-term self-interest of agency officials. 86 These dynamics disfavor broad application of Chevron deference.8 7 If agencies are given
wide discretion to construe regulatory statutes, their interpretations
will likewise be more subject to capture, directly and through the in84 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983);
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: Tle Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 42-58 (1984); see also FARBER & FmicKEv, supranote 5, at 89-102
(surveying public choice advocacy of textualism in general, and detailing Justice Scalia's
views in particular); MASHAW, supra note 5, at 89-93 (examining Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Macey's views); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988) (critiquing such approaches).
85 See sources cited supra note 81.
86 See, e.g., BARRY M. MrrNIcK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING,
DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FoRms 38 (1980); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78,
at 96-99; see also BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2-9 (1978).

87 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural ResourcesDefense Counci4 Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984), the Court held that when a regulatory statute is ambiguous, the judiciary must
defer to a reasonable interpretation offered by the agency, even if this is not the construction the court would have reached on its own. "Clearly, the case is troubling for those who
view the proper role of the judiciary as increasing rather than decreasing the costs to interest groups of implementing special interest oriented legislation." Macey, supra note 74, at
679.
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fluence of members of Congress, than an interpretation declared by
88
the independent judiciary.
In the most internally consistent public choice analyses, bad government decisionmaking-i.e., the subversion of public power to further private gain with a net loss in aggregate welfare and/or
unjustifiable wealth transfers between groups-is regarded as so inevitable that the ameliorative strategy is radical downsizing of the regulatory apparatus.8 9 Less dogmatic (or perhaps more pragmatic) public
choice analyses emphasize moving responsibility for regulatory policy
to institutions relatively less likely to make self-serving decisions that
harm the public interest. These institutions include (depending on
the account) the judiciary, 90 the few agencies that are, in established
political practice, relatively impervious to legislative blandishment or
92
retaliation, 91 and the President.
Moving power to the judiciary and such unusually politically autonomous agencies as the Federal Reserve Bank Board of Governors is
a favored general remedial strategy because these institutions tend to
be indifferent to the electoral and budgetary processes. Moving
power to the President is favored on the theory that his national electoral constituency disassociates his self-interest from that of geographically discrete groups of voters. lie can support policies that target
benefits to particular regions only by jeopardizing the votes and contributions of all regions not so favored. Similarly, while the President
needs the support of many interest groups to accomplish his reelection goals, the sheer magnitude of the electoral coalition he must assemble ensures that the President will be beholden to many but
captured by none. As a result, he is the one elected official whose selfinterest in reelection is aligned with the interests of the whole, rather
than any discrete part, of the nation. 9 3 The Unitary Executive move88
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 15, at 263 (arguing for reconsideration of "the commonly held view that prior interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies should be
afforded great deference").
89

See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of

Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 111-14 (2000) (explaining why radical deregulation is the only rigorously logical conclusion from public choice premises); see supra note
11.
90
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 15, at 263-64; Macey, supra note 74, at 675-92.
91 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 106-08; Miller, supra note 78, at
215-16.
92
See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 48-57; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78, at
85-86, 91-106.
93
This same description applies to the Vice President. Although traditionally that
office has not had much independent influence over regulatory policy, the role of Dan
Quayle in the first Bush Administration's Competitiveness Council, Al Gore in the Clinton
Administration's National Performance Review initiative, and Dick Cheney, ubiquitously,
in the second Bush Administration may signal a new era for the vice presidency.
We emphasize that we are reporting, not endorsing, these propositions about presidential incentives and motives. For criticism of this model on the merits, see, for example,
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ment relies on this model (in conjunction with arguments about original constitutional intent) to advocate expansive presidential authority
over regulatory decisionmaking as the only effective means of countering the interest group pandering produced by legislative oversight
94
of agencies.
To be sure, remaining true to the universal motivational premise
requires assuming that judges, Federal Reserve Board members, and
presidents will behave in self-interested ways. But freedom from the
imperative to procure support from narrowly drawn self-interested
constituencies means that their self-serving behavior will not be systematically tilted by the inexorable incentives of electoral politics. Having
no need to sell out the public good to particular private interests,
their judgments might-at least some of the time-coincide with the
public interest.
B.

A Psychological Model of Governmental Policy Failure

Psychological research suggests that humans' inevitable cognitive
reliance on heuristics creates a fundamental vulnerability to error. Although "heuristics... make us smart,"95 they also lead to predictable
patterns of mistakes. Consequently, policymaking structures and practices that fail to acknowledge the threat posed by illusions of judgment, and to employ measures that counteract human cognitive
limitations, will generate improvident regulatory policy.
Lay decisionmakers head American government. Members of
Congress, the President, and judges constantly make decisions in areas in which they have no expert training. Even more troublesome
than lack of knowledge is lay decisionmakers' lack of the training and
experience that would help them recognize when they should not rely
Farina, supra note 89, at 125-30; and Peter M. Shane, PoliticalAccountability in a System of
Checks and Balances: The Case of PresidentialReview of Rulemaking,48 Aiu. L. REv. 161 (1995).
Cf Steven A. Shull, PresidentialPolicymaking:An Introduction, in PRESIDENTIAL POLICMAKING:
AN END-OF-CENTuRY AssEssNMENT, supra note 76, at 3, 11 ("[M]any political scientists... see
no reason to believe that any proposed reforms to strengthen the presidency vis-O-vis Congress will further general as opposed to more specific interests or public policies.").
94
See, e.g., Calabresi, supranote 70, at 59-70, 81-90; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78,
at 105-06; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 78 (detailing the textualist-originalist
argument for the Unitary Executive theory).
If meaningful presidential control of agency policymaking were so assured, then Chevron deference would become a favored allocation of statutory interpretive power. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi, The StructuralConstitutionand the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 22 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 3, 6-8 (1998); see also Dan M. Kahan, ReallocatingInterpretive CriminalLawmaking Power Within the Executive Branch, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 47,
54-56 (recommending deference to Department ofJustice legal interpretations but not to
those of U.S. Attorney's Offices, because the latter are more independent of presidential
control); Miller, supra note 78, at 214-15 (advocating, in many contexts, giving the President "ahigh degree of interpretive power" because he is less prone to factional capture).
95
GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 29.
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on mental shortcuts. By contrast, administrative agencies are filled
with experts. Experts have the capacity to bring to policymaking not
only specialized substantive knowledge, but also the training and experience that provide tools for avoiding cognitive traps. At the same
time, however, they will be overconfident in their judgment, trapped
within particular ways of solving problems that arise from their training, and generally unable to temper their enthusiastic belief in their
professions and abilities.
Because government is apt to make bad choices when government decisionmakers rely on misleading heuristics, a successful system
of regulatory policymaking must recognize and take account of the
strengths and weaknesses of expert and lay judgment.
1.

Congress

At first assessment, Congress does not appear to be a promising
source of good public policy decisions. Both houses comprise people
who typically lack the sort of training that would create expertise in
making the vast array of decisions required in an ambitious regulatory
government. Members seem vulnerable to the cognitive illusions that
typically go unrecognized and unremediated by lay decisionmakers:
being more attuned to potential harm than to forgone benefits (framing effects); overestimating the prevalence of events that are easy to
remember (the availability heuristic); and disregarding the prevalence
of an event altogether in evaluating its importance (the representativeness heuristic). These cognitive biases might readily produce unwise regulatory choices. They can divert the legislative agenda to the
wrong set of problems and confine legislative thinking about
solutions.
Congress, however, is a more complicated institution than this
initial assessment suggests. Both houses delegate significant power, in
96
identifying problems and in constructing solutions, to committees.
The committee system provides a structural opportunity for Congress
to compensate for the limitations of lay membership. 97 Members who
do have some expertise in particular economic or social areas can be
given committee assignments that institutionally amplify this knowledge. 98 Committees can hold hearings at which outside experts, both
96 For a general discussion of how committees can function to stabilize and inform
the decisionmaking of the legislature, see FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 5, at 56.
97
See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); ARTHUR
MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 39-43 (1983); see also Nelson W. Polsby, The
Institutionalizationof the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 144 (1968) (arguing that the House responded to growing federal regulatory ambitions by developing a
complex system of formal division of labor).
98 We are not suggesting that this specialization and expertise-building is the only
function committees serve. Richard Fenno's well-known study in the 1970s found that
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partisan and neutral, provide further insights. 99 Finally, committee
members gain experience over time, allowing them to learn the pitfalls of intuitive decisionmaking. The reports issued by committees on
proposed legislation can make this expertise accessible to other
Members.1 00
In other words, two of the institutional characteristics of Congress
that incite the most criticism from public choice analysts-(1) the reliance upon a highly reticulated committee and subcommittee structure, and (2) the high incumbency rate that reliably sends more than
ninety percent of legislators back to the institution in each election
cycle-are, from the cognitive perspective, among the most promising
of its institutional decisionmaking adaptations.1 0 1
three goals motivated the committee assignments that Members sought: good public policy, influence within the chamber, and reelection, see RIcHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN
INCONINTTEES 1 (1973), and more contemporary accounts concur, seeROGER H. DAVIDSON
& WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 206-12 (7th ed. 2000). At the more

formal level, three models of committee function have emerged in the political science
literature: the chamber-dominated model, which emphasizes the information and expertise function we discuss here; the party-dominated model, which emphasizes the role of
committees in promoting the agenda of the majority party; and the committee autonomy
model, which emphasizes the familiar public choice behavior of pork production and logrolling. FORREST MALTzmAN, COMPETING PRINCIPALS: COMMITTEES, PARTIES, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 13-30 (1997). There is widespread agreement among political
scientists that "each model has some validity, but each provides only a partial picture of the
committee system." Id. at 5.
99 Again, we are observing what is institutionally possible. We are not suggesting that
information gathering is the only function of committee hearings. See DAVIDSON & OLES-

ZEK, supra note 98, at 217 (identifying the "overlapping purposes" served by hearings as
exploring the need for legislation, building a public record, providing publicity for members, reviewing executive branch behavior, and providing a forum for grievances). Neither
do we suggest that committee hearings are invariably balanced, openminded exercises in
information gathering. See Neal Devins, CongressionalFactfinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169, 1183-84 (2001) (describing ways in which
committee chairs and staff can manipulate hearings).
100
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 72
(2000) (committee reports "are often the only documents that legislators or their staffs
read before a vote of the full house on a bill"); ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION
140 (1973) ("Within the Senate itself, reports are important chiefly because many Senators
read nothing else before deciding how to vote on a particular bill."); cf.JOHN W. KINGDON,
CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 73-83 (3d ed. 1989) (reporting Members' statements

that cues from fellow Members are most influential in determining how to vote); DONALD
R MATrHEvS &JAMES A. STIMSON, YEAS AND NAYS: NOmtAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 49-51 (1975) (finding from a study of House voting that cues

from committee leaders are a significant determinant of Members' decisions).
101
Committees-and their chairs-tend to be the most demonized players in public
choice accounts of legislative action, portrayed as opportunistic entrepreneurs of regional
and special interest pandering whose preferences are likely to depart wildly from those of
the median legislator. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 84-85; Barry R. Weingast &
WilliamJ. Marshall, The IndustrialOrganizationof Congress; or, Why Legislatures,Like Finns, Are
Not Organizedas Markets, 96J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988); see alsoKenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R.
Weingast, Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes, in FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY IN THE 1980S

343 (Gregory B. Mills &John L. Palmer eds., 1984) (arguing that fiscal concerns are a byproduct of legislators' programmatic pursuit of power and election).
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Congress also has expanded its institutional access to expertise on
regulatory issues. A growing array of staff can supplement internal
knowledge and decisionmaking skills at both the Member and committee levels. 10 2 External sources of expertise include both the reports that Congress frequently requires from agencies and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), and the analyses that the GenConsiderable theoretical and empirical work challenges this picture as inaccurate or,
at least, highly oversimplified. See, e.g., D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:

CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS

(1991) (arguing that parties use committee appointments to align their preferences and
those of pivotal members); GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993) (extending this theory by discussing
means through which the majority party structures incentives to retain policy control, including distributing desired committee transfers according to party loyalty); KREHBIEL,
supra note 97 (interpreting the committee system as a means by which the House rewards
development of expertise and specialization); cf HALL, supra note 16, at 246 (finding that
lack of representativeness tended to occur in legislation with district-concentrated benefits
but not in other legislation and concluding that "if the bias of an interested few sometimes
subverts the will of an indolent majority, this is not a robust empirical regularity insofar as I
am able to determine"). Forrest Malzman, studying the committee appointment rules and
practices used in the House from 1975 to 1993, has demonstrated that these procedures
both enhanced the appointment of representative members to salient committees and provided members of salient committees with greater incentives to act as agents of the party
caucus and the chamber. His analysis of roll call votes concluded that "most committees
act in a manner acceptable to both the chamber and the majority-party caucus," with the
highest responsiveness shown by members of salient committees. MALTzMAN, supra note
98, at 7-8, 106-07. In the Senate, where decisionmaking tends to be less dominated by the
committee structure, Maltzman found that committees were even more likely to act as
faithful agents of the chamber majority. See id. at 143-56.
Incumbency facilitates the development of legislators known as "policy entrepreneurs," influential members who specialize in particular issues and are "recognized for
,stimulating more than ...responding' to outside political forces in a given field." DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 98, at 259 (quoting DAVID E. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE LAWS?:
CREATIVTY AND POWER IN SENATE COMMITTEES 297 (1972) (omission in original)). For example, Senator and physician Bill Frist of Tennessee has tremendous influence on his colleagues on issues requiring scientific or medical expertise, as was recently demonstrated in
the debate over stem-cell research. See MorningEdition: Attention to Stem-Cell Research (NPR
radio broadcast, July 19, 2001), available at 2001 WL 9328213.
102
"Congressional legislative staff ... often times represent a thread of continuity,
institutional memory, and expertise within the institution." Barbara S. Romzek &Jennifer
A. Utter, CongressionalLegislative Staff. PoliticalProfessionals or Clerks?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCL
1251, 1252 (1997) (concluding, from study of staff in the 104th Congress, that legislative
staff represent "an emerging profession" with a specialized substantive and institutional
knowledge base, an ethic of service, and various norms of loyalty, responsiveness, and hard
work); see also HALL, supra note 16, at 89 ("Often a member will hire a particular staffer
who can bring relevant experience to the enterprise."). Although most of the increase in
personal staff is devoted to constituent service, see NoRwANJ. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1999-2000, at 126 (2000), research and policy initiatives are a large part
of staff responsibilities, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 596-97 (5th ed.
2000); DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 98, at 219-21. Moreover, most of the post-World
War II increase in nonpersonal staff is attributable to information support services such as
the Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional
Budget Office, and (until its abolition in 1995) the Office of Technology Assessment. ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 126.
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eral Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office, and
the Congressional Research Service generate. 0 3 These expert bodies
will likely adopt a different decisionmaking perspective on the
problems they are asked to address, providing at least the opportunity
for Congress to expose itself to novel perspectives "outside" the immediate decisions it must make.
2.

The President

The President is also a lay decisionmaker. To the extent that he
personally makes a decision, it is likely to be in an area in which he
has no personal expertise. Furthermore, the time that the modern
President has available to devote to any single decision is quite limited. 10 4 Consequently, much more so than Congress, the President is
likely to rely on heuristics in evaluating the options. In fact, the President fits the pattern that most concerns cognitive psychologists: the
decisionmaker who must make complex choices quickly, based on imperfect information, in areas in which he has no expertise or training.
Like Congress, the President has numerous advisers to provide
expertise. Moreover, as exemplified by the evolution of national security decisionmaking during the Kennedy Administration, the President can organize executive staff in decisionmaking configurations
that minimize the adverse effects of heuristics. Finally, to varying degrees Presidents delegate decisionmaking to subordinates, who might
have both the expert knowledge and training to enable them to avoid
cognitive pitfalls in their area of responsibility.
Several factors, however, mitigate the President's ability to escape
the cognitive vulnerabilities of lay decisionmaking. First, in contemporary practice, a President's close advisers are more apt to be political experts and time-tested personal allies than true experts in
substantive policy areas. 0 5 Furthermore, the President cannot specialize and develop decisionmaking expertise in a substantive area.
103
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 98, at 220-21; JAMtES W. FESLER & DONALD F.
KErrL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMIINISTRATIVE PROCESS 279-81 (1991); HALL, supra note 16,
at 90-91.
104 "[T]he [P]resident's time is the scarcest commodity in the White House .
Richard Rose, Organizing Issues In and OrganizingProblems Out, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 105, 107 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1991); see Hugh Heclo, The Changing Presidential
Office, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, sup7a, at 33.

See, e.g., LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY. WASHINGTON TO CLIN252-53 (1996) (describing the pattern of presidential reliance on "small groups of
loyal advisers" and quoting Nixon personnel advisor Frederic Malek as saying "'[y] ou don't
get the best people[;] [y]ou get the people you know'");James P. Pfiffner, Can the President
Manage the Government? Should He?, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 1, 8
("[I] n the second half of the twentieth century power has slipped from the cabinet to the
White House staff" who have the President's trust and support "because of long and close
association.").
105

TON
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With responsibility for the full range of foreign and military affairs in
addition to domestic policy issues, the modem President bears a burden of policy judgment and management even broader than that of
Congress.1 0 6 Yet the same steeply pyramidal structure that gives the
President the advantage in decisional speed and coordination sacrifices the collegial opportunity to become institutionally smarter
through division of labor. Finally, the President and his advisers do
not have the legislative luxury of time to learn from experience. He
will have barely established a stable and functioning administration
when he must attend to the crucial midterm legislative elections that
may force him to adapt to a shift in the balance of political power, or
at least in the prevailing political mood of the country.'0 7 His own
reelection bid looms shortly thereafter and, unlike the average member of Congress, he is highly vulnerable to being defeated. And, if he
does secure reelection, his second term is unalterably his last.
This analysis supports two observations commonly made about
the presidency. First, Presidents who have relatively hands-off managerial styles are often rated as more effective than Presidents who
overwork themselves trying to be personally involved in all significant
decisions.' 0 8 As the ultimate lay decisionmaker with high vulnerability
to the cognitive pitfalls of heuristics, the President who personally
makes a large number of policy decisions is likely to make a significant
number ofjudgmental errors. Second, new administrations will make
106

See, e.g.,

BERT

A. RoCVVIAN,

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE

168 (1984) ("[Modem] [t]rends have made more difficult for presidents
that which was always difficult but less aspired to-command of the instrumentalities of
government and control over policy."); Heclo, supra note 104, at 38 ("Presidential power
has increased by becoming more extended, scattered, and shared; it has decreased by becoming less of a prerogative, less unilateral, and less closely held by the man himself.").
107
The now-familiar pattern of the president's party losing at least one house of Congress at the midterm election is part of the larger post-World War II phenomenon of
"divided govemment"-the election of a president of one party and simultaneously (or
within two years) a Congress dominated by the opposite party. See Farina, supra note 77, at
999 & n.51 (providing statistics). This phenomenon has generated intense scholarly, as
well as practical, interest but very little generally accepted explanatory or predictive theory.
See generally MoRRIs FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996) (identifying divided government as one of the central analytical challenges for contemporary American political
science).
108 Ronald Reagan's first term has become the poster child for the former style of
presidential leadership, just as Jimmy Carter's presidency (at least in its early years) is generally cited as exemplifying the latter. See, e.g., Bruce Buchanan, ConstrainedDiversity: The
OrganizationalDemands of the Presidency, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at
78 (reviewing various positive assessments of Reagan's first-term management approach,
although ultimately proposing modifications); James P. Pfiffner, PresidentialConstraintsand
Transitions, in PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING: AN END-OF-CENTURY ASSESSMENT, supra note 76,
at 19, 19-23 (identifying unwillingness to delegate significant authority to chief of staff as
source of early Carter and Clinton administration problems); see also Heclo, supra note 104,
at 40-42 (describing various staff management practices); Pfiffner, supra note 105, at 1
(noting "the rising importance of the institutional staff of presidents").
AMERICAN SYSTEM
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mistakes that seem quite foolish in hindsight.10 9 The decisionmaking
strategies of a new White House staff are invariably unsettled, as the
President's advisers struggle to determine how best to make decisions.
Although political scientists and historians urge new presidents to
learn from the organizational experience of earlier Chief Executives,1 10 the fact that a new administration typically enters office with
an emphatic conviction of its predecessor's errors (and a consequent
determination to "clean house") poses formidable obstacles to the development of a robust institutional memory in the White House. 1
Lacking the structural and personnel continuity of Congress, the presidency tends to reinvent its decisionmaking processes every four or
eight years.
3.

The Courts

From the psychological perspective, the courts are probably the
institution least well-suited to making policy decisions that avoid cognitive traps.1 12 With a few exceptions (e.g., the Court of International
Trade, and the Federal Circuit to some extent), the federal judiciary
has remained a body of generalists despite recurring arguments for
the creation of specialized courts. Hence, judges will be experts in
procedure and law and, as members of an expert profession, will have
learned a variety of adaptations to minimize erroneous judgments on
these points.1 13 With respect to substantive issues, however, they almost invariably occupy the position of lay decisionmakers. Although
experts do play a role in judicial decisionmaking, the American com109 See, e.g., George C. Edwards III, EvaluatingClinton's Performancein Congress, in PRESiDENTIAL PoLicmYNiamN: AN END-OF-CENTURY ASSESSMENT, supra note 76, at 119, 128 (assess-

ing early Clinton Administration problems, including "self-inflicted wounds"); Pfiffner,
supra note 108, at 19-23 (analyzing and contrasting Carter and Clinton early failures and
Reagan first-year success).
110 E.g., Buchanan, supra note 108, at 78-79; Heclo, supra note 104, at 33-34; Richard
E. Neustadt, Does the White House Need a Strong Chief of Staf., in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 29; Richard E. Neustadt, Memorandum on Staffing the President-Elec
in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 19.

111 "Each president in recent times has begun office with the supposition that the government has no organic past. At each turn, the wheel is to be reinvented anew. At their
core, arguments for [strong presidential control over policymaking] conclude that leadership is equivalent to the introduction of novelty .

. . ."

Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A.

Rockman, Mandates orMandarins? Controland Discretion in the Modern Administrative State, in
THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 158, 163; see also RocMAN, supra note 106,
at 207 (observing that administrations that emphasize strong presidential control tend to
see career administrators as sources of policymaking problems, rather than solutions;
"[w]hatever limited memory government possesses and whatever constraints this imposes

upon rashness are treated as obstacles to be overcome"); Pfiffner, supra note 105, at 8-12
(reviewing how presidents since the 1950s have reacted against the management style of
their predecessors).
112 See Gillette & Krier, supranote 24, at 1058-61.
113 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:Ignorance orAdaptationt 79
OR. L. REV. 61, 62-66 (2000).
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mitment to an adversarial rather than an inquisitorial system for adducing evidence, as well as strictures in the rules of evidence
themselves, give judges far less flexibility than either Congress or the
1 14
President in using experts to supplement their decisional process.
Finally, to the extent that juries are involved, the decision rests in the
hands of those who are experts neither in the substance nor in the
1 15
application of law.
Courts also decide problems one case at a time. Although this
approach has virtues, 1 16 it also raises the possibility that judges will be
more prone to the influence of cognitive illusions than will either
Congress or the President.1 17 As noted above,'1 8 several cognitive illusions can be avoided by stepping outside of a decisionmaking problem
and seeing similarities between the issue at hand and other related
problems. If the case seems unique, adopting an outsider perspective
will be difficult.

To some extent, the judiciary has compensated for this by adopting a decisional paradigm that emphasizes precedent. Litigants, law
clerks, and judges are accustomed by professional training to searching for other cases and discerning relevant similarities and differences. It is far from clear, however, that this professional adaptation
serves courts as well in the context of contemporary regulatory policy
as it does in the common-law context in which it developed. Regulatory issues often present a high level of technical and factual complexity, and cases involving any given issue are likely to be relatively
infrequent. Particularly for courts and litigants that are not repeat
players in the particular substantive area, selecting appropriate analogies and making apt distinctions may be quite difficult. More broadly,
the paradigmatic judicial mindset of deciding cases one at a time in
whatever order the litigants bring them makes it less likely that
courts-as compared with the other decisional institutions of government-will take an outsider perspective. Although Congress, the
President, and agencies often attend to a problem because a specific
event makes it politically salient, these actors can more readily escape
the procedural constraints and professional enculturation that continually focus judicial attention on the situation of the parties in the particular case.
114

For a comprehensive review of the institutional factors that may give Congress the
advantage over courts in finding "social facts," see Devins, supra note 99, at 1177-82.
115 See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can'tDo Well: TheJury's Performance
as a Risk Manager,40 ARiz. L. REv. 901 (1998).
116
See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU(1999).
See Gillette & Krier, supra note 24, at 1058-61.
See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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4. Administrative Agencies
The only real experts in the government are found in administrative agencies. They have the training and experience to avoid cognitive traps commonly encountered in their area of specialty; they will
know when and how to adopt different perspectives on decisionmaking problems.
To be sure, the heads of agencies are political appointees who typically are not true experts in their fields. Like the President, such lay
decisionmakers will face many demands on their time and, consequently, be vulnerable to making quick decisions based on imperfect
information. Still, even agency heads have several cognitive advantages over the President. First, they have a limited domain of substantive responsibility, which allows for the possibility of specialization.
Second, most come to their positions notjust because of political suitability but also because of some experience (acquired in the private
sector, academia, or other government service) with the substantive
problems their agency is supposed to address. 119 Finally, they make
policy judgments through a closer institutional relationship with the
expertise of a permanent staff where most regulatory decisions originate. The institutional drag of career staff is frequently bemoaned by
a new administration anxious to sweep clean with its new broom. But,
once again, a frequently attacked feature of contemporary government structure has decided virtues from the psychological perspective:
The agency's career staff provide an ongoing repository not only of
substantive knowledge but also of decisionmaking experience, so that
agencies (unlike their White House overseers) need not reinvent the
wheel every four or eight years.
The problem with administrative agencies is the problem that all
experts face: They are apt to be overconfident in their decisionmaking. Experts fail to look beyond the factors that their training and
experience predispose them to consider; they tend not to test thoroughly their assumptions. Experts are right more often than laypersons, but not as often as they think. Furthermore, experts in
administrative agencies are unlikely to mirror the range of values and
priorities of the larger society they are supposed to serve. Most of the
staff of the Army Corps of Engineers or the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) will not have arrived at their employment at random.
Those who join an agency with the principal mission of building dams
probably do so because they like the prospect of building dams.
Those who seek work at an agency charged with responsibility for the
119
See G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 114-17
(1981); William G. Ross, The Senate's ConstitutionalRole in Confirming CabinetNominees and
Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1123, 1152-59 (1998).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:549

environment probably have strong views about the appropriate goals
and means of environmental regulation. Consequently, agencies can
become myopically focused on their missions.
5.

The Reasons for, and General Strategies Against, Bad Public
Policy-with an Important Initial Caveat About Scope

The model of government based on cognitive psychology proposes that bad public policy occurs when decisionmaking structures
and protocols fail to counteract human cognitive limitations. Particularly with respect to regulatory issues, poor judgments are likely to
occur if the components of the policymaking process are not designed
to exploit the distinctive strengths, and antidote the distinctive weaknesses, of expert and lay decisionmakers.
At this point, it is important to be more specific about the kinds
of poor government judgments we are addressing. We do not contend that a cognitive psychological model can explain every sort of
"bad" regulatory policy choice. Many people considered the abortion
gag order regulation 120 adopted by the Department of Health and
Human Services in the first Bush Administration to have been very
bad policy, while others reserved that characterization for the Clinton
Administration's reversal of the rule.1 2 1 Regulation that efficiently
and effectively pursues its announced objective is outside the scope of
our thesis, even if that objective can be persuasively criticized on
moral, ethical, or philosophical grounds.
Similarly beyond our scope is regulation that intentionally redistributes wealth or otherwise deliberately values one social interest at
the expense of others so long as it actually furthers such distributional
preferences. Thus, price subsidies targeted to farm families or development restrictions to protect the spotted owl would come within our
thesis only if the regulations either did not in fact further these objectives, or imposed costs out of proportion to the benefit conferred on
the favored interest. We recognize that using the criteria of efficiency
and cost-benefit proportionality potentially undermines the distinctions we wish to draw. If a regulation designed to control the health
risks of arsenic in fact reduces arsenic levels in drinking water but at a
cost of about $7 million per life saved,1 22 is it the sort of "bad" policy
120 Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion
Is a Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services
Projects, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (Feb. 2, 1988).
121 See Memorandum on the Title X "Gag Rule," 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (1993).
122 EPA's data supporting the proposed arsenic regulation, which was suspended for
several months by the Bush Administration, estimated a savings of 28 lives at a cost of S210
million. A competing analysis, by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
asserted that only 11 lives, at best, would be saved-at a cost of about $19 million per life.
Cass Sunstein's careful assessment of both analyses concludes that defensible assumptions
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choice that we address? Our tentative answer is: "It depends." When
regulation attains its objectives at a cost beyond what the overall regulatory context establishes as the "normal" valuation of the interest pursued,1 23 then the regulatory choice falls within our thesis unless and
until the premium above normal value has become sufficiently politically salient that its continuation can be considered a deliberate (even
24
if arguably misguided) social choice.'
Later in the discussion, we suggest additional ways in which the
undifferentiated mass of "regulatory failure" claims must be more
thoughtfully sorted if successful remedial strategies are to be discovered.125 For the moment, though, the foregoing set of distinctions is
sufficient to allow us to recognize the broad outlines of a policymaking process that, under the psychological model, minimizes bad decisions: It will recognize that lay decisionmakers are vulnerable to
relying on misleading heuristics, particularly when required to make a
large number of factually complex or predictive decisions. It will rely
upon experts for their knowledge and for their decisionmaking competence, but will provide mechanisms that counteract their hyperconfidence and tunnel vision. It will have protocols that force
decisionmakers to view issues from different perspectives. It will have
practices that take problems that appear to be unique, one-of-a-kind
judgment calls, and move them from the illusion-filed realm of intuition into the more disciplined regime of a broader class of problems
approached through deductive reasoning.
These insights, when compared with the premises of public
choice theory, provide a very different perspective on how the various
American institutions of government contribute to poor regulatory
decisions. Public choice places blame for bad policy at the doorstep
of a Congress obsessed with geographical favoritism and subservient
produce estimates ranging from 6 to 112 lives saved-yielding, under EPA cost assumptions, a range of $1.1 to $33 million per life saved. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE ARITHMETIC OF

ARSENIC 33 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 01-10,
2001), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working-01-10.
pdf.
123 At present, agencies currently value a human life in the range of $2.5 to $5.9 million. See ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LrrAN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD GOVERNMENT
REPORT ON THE BENEFITS AND CoSTs OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 10 & n.37 (AEI-Brookings
Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Regulatory Analysis No. 00-1, 2000), available at http://

iwv.aei.brookings.org/publications/reganalyses/reg-analysis0L01l.pdf.
124 A very different category of "bad" government choices that fall outside our thesis
are policies adopted despite their lack of support by the majority of decisionmakers because
of procedural flaws in collective decisionmaking. As we understand the literature on cycling and other Arrow problems, there is considerable debate about how often these theoretically worrisome possibilities of democratic decisionmaking in fact eventuate. See, e.g.,
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 5, at 38-42, 47-55; GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 11,
98-146; MASHA-W, supra note 5, at 12-15, 40-44.

125

See infra Part III.B.1.
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to rent-seeking private interests. That model tends to laud the independence of the judiciary and the President's supposed loyalty to the
interests of a nationwide constituency. The psychological model, by
contrast, is highly skeptical of policymaking by the President and the
courts, viewing them as overworked perpetual amateurs likely to rely
on erroneous heuristics. It sees in Congress the capacity to counteract
the cognitive vulnerabilities of lay decisionmaking through institutional structures and practices that can develop both substantive and
decisional expertise.
The psychological perspective on agencies' role in poor regulatory choices is also quite different from that of public choice theory,
although the differences tend to be more nuanced. Public choice assumes that agencies, operating largely outside the public view, will
produce bad policy because of capture by interest groups. Congressional oversight only exacerbates the problem; judicial review and
presidential oversight can impose some checks on rampant rent-seeking and interest group pandering. The psychological model places
much more confidence in agencies. It assumes that when they err,
the reason is likely to be expert overconfidence and myopia. Oversight relationships with all three branches can help agencies minimize
such errors, but only if the nature of the oversight is tailored to the
relative virtues and weaknesses of expert and lay decisionmaking. In
particular, from this perspective, intensive presidential involvement in
regulatory policymaking appears more likely to introduce error than
correct it. The next Part develops in more detail specific implications
of the psychological model.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE

Two

MODELS

One reason public choice theory so profoundly affects contemporary legal thinking about government structure is the ingenuity with
which its proponents have argued that their model explains andjustifies the institutional design choices in the Constitution. In particular,
the concern expressed by prominent Framers about the mischief
caused by overactive legislatures, 126 and the Madisonian anxiety about
"faction,"' 27 are said to presage contemporary insights about interest
groups, rent extraction, and generally self-serving political behavior. 128 In this way, originalist constitutional interpretation and Chi126

E.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 37, 62 (James Madison).

See Farina, supra note 77, at

1010-15.
127
128

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
E.g., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM (Bernard Grofman &

Donald Wittman eds., 1989); PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (James D.

Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Richard A. Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153 (1987) [hereinafter Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution];
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cago-school economic theory come together to authenticate public
choice as the best descriptive model of American government. In
turn, such claims about descriptive "fit" are offered to confirm the
model's superior qualifications for generating prescriptions for fur129
ther action.
In subpart A, we suggest that, if the goal is explaining the design
choices of the structural Constitution, the insights from cognitive theory actually provide a better descriptive model than public choice.
We are not making the strong explanatory claim that the Framers were
proto-cognitive theorists. Moreover, we are agnostic about whether a
theory's capacity to explain the decisions of the Framers enhances its
contemporary prescriptive credentials. We are simply observing that,
to whatever extent it is significant that a model of optimal government
design can be overlaid upon the Constitution's specifications of governing institutions and practices, cognitive theory is in fact a better fit
than public choice theory. In subpart B, we begin to develop some of
the prescriptive implications of the psychological model for the structures and processes of regulatory policymaking.
A.

Positive Implications
1. Legislation

The public choice model is essentially pessimistic about the capacity of government to further the public good. 130 Deeply suspicious
of Congress as obsessed with furthering geographically parochial interests and prey to rent-seeking interest groups, it is profoundly skeptical that legislative policymaking will increase the general welfare.' 3 '
The less legislation produced, the better. The model thus lauds those
mechanisms in the Constitution that curb legislatures by making lawmaking cumbersome. 132 Bicameralism is valued for increasing the
requisite level of political consensus, and hence decreasing the
amount of legislation that even the most enthusiastically wealth-transRichard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703,
710-17 (1984); Lessig & Sunstein, supranote 78, at 93-106; Macey, supranote 21;Jonathan
R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to ConstitutionalTheory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in ConstitutionalTheory, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 196; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLutM. L. REv. 1689, 1690-91 (1984).
129 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 93-106 (using asserted parallel between original structural choices and contemporary concern about rent-seeking and faction asjustification for several public choice-based changes to regulatory decisionmaking).
130
See, eg.,Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and ConstitutionalTheory, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 280 (2002).
131 See supra Part II.B.1.
132
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 69, at 52-59; Macey, supra note 128, at 493-95; Miller,
supra note 128, at 202.
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ferring legislature can enact. 13 3 The presentment requirement is
praised as erecting not simply an additional hurdle to lawmaking, but
a hurdle virtually proof against being undermined by factional pressure.13 4 The creation of a judiciary independent of the legislature
through life tenure and salary protection is explained as designed to
protect private liberty and property from violence and
13 5

expropriation.

Yet, on the model's own terms, these are strangely inadequate
choices about institutional design if the object is controlling destructive, rent-seeking legislative behavior and channeling government
power to decisional entities whose self-interest may be more aligned
with the public good.
In the first place, the President-modeled to be the most likely
source of truly public-regarding policy because he has the least incentive to favor narrowly regional interests and the greatest resistance to
capture by interest groups-is given only a limited role in the principal process through which domestic public policy is made. His constitutional prerogative to propose legislation 13 6 is merely the
opportunity, not the right, to control the legislative agenda. The prerogative to veto is, to be sure, a different matter and can give him
significant leverage with Congress. But, in terms of institutional design, the veto is a curiously blunt tool to give the elected decisionmaker with (under the model's assumptions) the best incentives
to make good policy choices. The President can block legislation, not
rewrite it. With no constitutional provision for a line-item veto, Congress remains free to immunize measures that pander to regional constituents and interest groups by packaging them with measures that
the President strongly desires.
Similarly, the courts-whose independence from regional and interest group pressures is modeled as allowing the possibility of decisions aligned with the public interest-are given only limited
opportunity to work against suboptimal legislation. Proposals for a
Council of Revision, that would have given judges a role in writing
133

See, e.g., Macey, supra note 15, at 247-48; Macey, supra note 128, at 500-02; see also

JAmES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 233-48 (1965) (for a mathematical analysis of this
issue); ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE
AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROuP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 45-57 (1981)
(same).
134 Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the InstitutionalTransformationof Interests,
61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1443, 1465 (1994); cf. Calabresi, supra note 70, at 78-81 (arguing for
expansive presidential line-item veto power as a faction control device).
135
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 15, at 250-56; Macey, supra note 128, at 496-500; Miller,
supra note 128, at 209-17, 221-22.
136
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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statutes, were rejected in the constitutional drafting process.' 3 7 Thus,
like the President, the judiciary is confined to a reactive role. Unlike
the President, who can veto legislation because he deems it bad policy, judges are limited by conventional canons of judicial review to
invalidating statutes only for unconstitutionality. Beyond that, judicial
tools for controlling bad policy choices are the relatively marginal
ones of refusing to rely on legislative history and strictly interpreting
the text of statutes.
Finally (and most important to our inquiry), the ability of the
legislature to enact statutes that delegate enormous power to agencies
appears to be an enormous constitutional design defect. Regulatory
statutes enable members of Congress to set up vast policymaking enterprises outside the repressive bounds of the Article I, Section 7 process.1 38 Unless agencies are so autonomous of legislative control that
they do not need to pander to members of Congress or interest
groups in order to preserve their budget and jurisdiction-i.e., unless
they are like the Federal Reserve Board-they simply replicate all the
dangers of legislatures without even the limited curbs of bicameralism
and presentment. And if they are so autonomous, it becomes difficult
as a theoretical matter to square their existence with the three-branch
constitutional structure.
Unitary Executive theorists attempt to save the day by patching
together a number of clauses in Article II to discern a basis for placing
agencies squarely under the exclusive direction of the President.13 9
The goal is to allow him to avert the dangers of delegation by harnessing regulatory policymaking power to his own, more public-regarding
control. But this solution has all the earmarks of a desperate salvage
mission. It produces the interpretive incongruity that the vast bulk of
important government decisionmaking goes on outside the principal
constitutional design framework for policymaking (i.e., Article I). Instead, it is squeezed into a constitutional paradigm (law execution),
the practices and processes of which are remarkably underspecified
given their asserted centrality in determining the domestic public policy of the nation.
137

SeeJACK

N.

RAKovE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE

CONSTITUTION 261-62 (1996).

138 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 128, at 514 ("The very existence of such agencies is a
glaring contradiction of the carefully constructed lawmaking procedures articulated in article I .... ."); see also Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution,supranote 128, at 156 (arguing

that delegation is therefore unconstitutional); William T. Mayton, The Possibilitiesof Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative
Agencies, 1986 DuKE L.J. 948, 964-65 (same).
139 The principal textual elements of the argument are the Article II Vesting Clause,
the Opinions Clause, and the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, § 2, cl. 1, § 3.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supranote 78, at 570-72, 582-85; cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 78 (disputing this interpretation on textual and contextual grounds).
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The psychological model offers a contrasting perspective. Less
relentlessly pessimistic about the capacity of humans to establish public institutions and practices that produce good policy decisions, it
more comfortably explains many structural features of American government policymaking.
First and perhaps most essential, the psychological model does
not proceed from hostility to legislatures and their decisional product.
As a group of largely lay decisionmakers, Congress can make mistakes,
but it also has greater potential than any of the other key constitutional actors for creating expertise within itself and structuring its
processes to correct for errors. 140 If principal policymaking responsibility is assigned to a collegial body of any appreciable size, a committee structure can be reasonably expected quickly to emerge. And,
41
indeed, this was exactly what happened in the early Congresses.1
Committees provide the opportunity for an efficient allocation of
work and, most important for present purposes, the development of
expert knowledge and experience. Particularly in the design of the
Senate (which incorporates not only the longest term of any elected
federal official but also provision for staggered elections), an institutional memory both of substantive knowledge and decisionmaking
competence was ensured. At the same time, because legislation cannot pass without the votes of members not in the responsible originating committee (s), the body as a decisional whole has some protection
against proposals generated by overconfident experts. Bicameralism
provides even further protection. Requiring debate and approval by
two chambers-with different constituencies, different repositories of
expertise, and different procedures-helps ensure that problems are
examined from different perspectives and may help moderate the influence of various cognitive illusions.
Similarly, in this model the relatively modest role of the President
in the lawmaking process is easier to understand. The President can
be a supplementary institutional defense against errors that elude corrective mechanisms within the legislature itself. Experts are sometimes wrong, and if the repositories of expertise in Congress have
managed to lead their colleagues into error, the presentment requirement offers yet another perspective on the substantive problem. But,
because he is a perpetual layperson in the system, the President's formal constitutional role in lawmaking does not extend beyond this
checking function into a prerogative to rewrite the content of legislation. The exception to this preference for placing primary decisional
140

See supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., DAVIDSON &

OLESZEK, supra note 98, at 200 ("About 350 ad hoc committees
were formed during the Third Congress (1793-1795) alone."); GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, HisTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 70-108 (2d ed. 1976).
141
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responsibility in the elected body most capable of developing expertise is presidential authority in the context of military matters and
some foreign affairs. Here, the requirements of rapid action and
highly centralized decisionmaking necessarily trump concerns about
vulnerability to cognitive illusions.
In the psychological model, the courts are not expected to constrain a perpetually untrustworthy legislature with the meager tools of
minimum rationality review and grudging interpretive techniques.
Rather, the judiciary performs the subsidiary (though important)
function of making statutes work in specific contexts. Overconfident
legislatures might fail to spot issues incompletely resolved or problems
inadequately addressed. Just as civil engineers know that, despite
their expertise, they cannot anticipate all of the ways in which their
buildings might fail in practice, so thoughtful designers of government decisional structures would know that legislatures cannot anticipate all of the ways in which statutes might fall short when applied.
Consequently, a gap-filling institution must be provided. For this purpose, the courts' "one case at a time" methodology is not so troublesome. So long as the statute is relatively clear in its substantive
objectives and methodological choices, judges can reason their way
incrementally toward completing the details within the master legislative plan.
In other words, rather than modeling the President and the judiciary as designed to counteract the rampant rent-seeking of a
voracious legislature with a limited set of relatively feeble reactive
tools-an institutional design about as astute as asking Hercules to
clean out the Augean stables with a spoon and a water pistol-the
psychological model sees these actors as sensibly situated to respond
to the kinds of mistakes or shortcomings of judgment that Congress
might be predicted to make. Their powers and practices are wellsuited to multiplying the perspectives from which a problem is viewed,
checking the overconfidence of expertise, and filling the voids inevitable in prospective judgment.
Finally, in the psychological model, legislation that broadly delegates the job of solving complex regulatory problems to administrative
agencies presents an opportunity for better decisionmaking, rather
than an occasion for constitutional hand-wringing. If well-structured-designed to exploit the cognitive superiority of true expertise
while compensating for its cognitive vulnerabilities-a system of administrative agencies is the best institutional recipient of the responsibility to particularize regulatory goals and means, within general
policy outlines supplied by the legislature. Moreover, as the next section explains, the relationships between agencies and the courts and
the President need not be radically discontinuous with the role of
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judges and the Chief Executive when policy emerges directly from
Congress. Rather, what the judiciary and the White House bring to
the administrative decisional process is quite similar in objective to
their role in legislation although, in the case of agency decisionmaking, a more intensive methodology may be justified.
2.

Review of Administrative Action

In the public choice model, agencies are only slightly less trustworthy than legislatures, pandering to interest groups either directly
or derivatively through the influence of powerful members of Congress. Two significant developments in administrative law in the
1970s-(1) the expansion of participation rights that opened both
agency rulemaking and (to a lesser extent) adjudication to a wide
range of groups representing the public as well as narrower interests,
and (2) the intensification ofjudicial review from the traditionally deferential version of rationality review to the searching scrutiny of "hard
look"-might be understood to address the problem of agency capture by counteracting agency alliances with powerful political
142
insiders.
As with legislation, however, the remedy is not very well tailored
to the public choice diagnosis. There is little chance that compulsory
exposure to other points of view during the policymaking process will
redeem an agency that has sold out to an interest group. Even under
the regime of hard-look review, an agency determined to adopt a policy favoring a particular political constituency has abundant opportunities, in how it creates the record and explains its decision, to
disguise its pandering. Only in the marginal case in which the interest-group-favoring policy cannot be even plausibly justified within the
typically capacious boundaries of the statutory delegation and the typically conflicting contents of the administrative record, will public participation and judicial review defeat agency capture.
By contrast, public participation and judicial supervision are excellent cures for an agency pursuing its public-interested mandate in
good faith, but predictably vulnerable to expert myopia and overconfidence. Hard-look review forces an agency to articulate the factors it
considers relevant to its decision, engage in some perceptible assessment of alternative courses of action, and respond to meaningful
comments by outsiders. Cognitive psychological research indicates
that one of the best mechanisms for reducing overconfident judgments is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully review
arguments against one's position. Having to assess the force of criti142

See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L.

REv. 1669 (1975).
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cisms coming from a variety of perspectives, and craft a persuasive response to those criticisms that are (or may be viewed by a reviewing
court as) significant, helps an agency to step outside of the decisionmaking process. In other words, under an assumption that agencies
are attempting to make good decisions, rather than determined to get
away with bad ones, structuring administrative decisionmaking to provide meaningful public participation and to culminate in hard-look
43
review is a thoroughly sensible debiasing strategy.
As a general matter then, the psychological model sees judicial
oversight of agencies as parallel to the judicial role in legislative decisionmaking. The primary responsibility for judgment rests with those
who have developed some expertise; review by a generalistjudiciary is
available to moderate problems of expert overconfidence. What differs in the case of agency decisionmaking is the intensity of the oversight. Judicial review makes far more demands-in terms of process,
sufficiency of record, and explanation-of agencies than of Congress.
Several institutional factors could account for this difference. Agency
decisional protocols typically do not replicate the broad multi-perspectivity provided by bicameralism and presentment. Moreover
agencies, unlike Congress, are not routinely called upon to solve
problems outside a particular regulatory area; although they gain in
depth of expertise from this concentrated focus, they pay a price in
breadth of vision. These institutional differences may justify more
concern for external debiasing of agency decisionmaking, and so
could explain the emergence of more assertive judicial review.
Significantly, however, all of the intensity of hard-look review is
directed toward identifying flaws in the agency's decisional process.
So long as the practice accords with the theory, hard-look review is not a
direction for judges to take a more aggressive substantive role in policymaking by displacing the agency's judgment. Much of the gain
from delegation to a body of experts would be lost if the oversight
process were structured to allow their judgment to be readily supplanted by the vulnerable judgment of laypersons.
This latter observation may explain the fact that the President has
a less direct role in agency policymaking than he has in the legislative
process. The veto power has historically been understood to allow
(perhaps even encourage) the President to block legislation because
he deems it bad policy. Some Unitary Executive theorists have argued
that the President should have the identical prerogative with respect
to agency decisionmaking.'4 However, mainstream administrative
143 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing Social Conformity, andJudicialReview ofAgency
Rulemaking, 87 CoRNaLr. L. REv. 486, 490-91 (2002) (arguing that judicial review of
rulemaking improves "the overall quality of rules").
144 See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 78, at 595-96.
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law theory and conventional practice do not give the President this
degree of authority to substitute his judgment for the agency's.
Rather, White House oversight-again, to the extent that practice accords
with theory145-is aimed at countering expert overconfidence and myopia. Particularly with respect to the latter problem (i.e., failure of the
agency to recognize the implications of its decision for other areas),
presidential oversight can bring something to the decisional process
that judicial oversight cannot. Courts are good at focusing on how
well the agency has thought through a particular problem within the
confines of a particular administrative record. Presidents, sharing
with Congress the need to attend to the universe of public policy
problems, are good at focusing on how well the agency's proposed
solution fits into the larger framework of national regulatory policy.
B.

Normative Implications

The foregoing suggests that, in terms of optimal institutional design, American government has gotten it pretty much right. More
specifically, it suggests that the U.S. public policymaking process does
not have the sort of deep, systemic flaws that produce pervasive, inevitable regulatory failure. And, indeed, we place ourselves squarely in
the camp of those who think that the failure thesis is often overstated.
Still, regulation goes wrong more often than contemporary Americans are willing to accept.' 4 6 What insights can the psychological
model offer to decrease the incidence of poor regulatory judgments?

See infra text accompanying notes 158-67.
Revealing a robust capacity for paradox, Americans continue to demand government solutions to environmental, social, and economic problems while condemning government action as incompetent and wasteful. For example, in 1997 Paul C. Light, political
scientist and first director of the Center for Public Service at the Brookings Institution,
reported bleakly that "[a]n overwhelming majority of Americans . . . believe that government wastes their money and causes more problems than it solves." Paul C. Light, The
'Quiet Crisis,' 10 Years Later, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1997, at 53. Yet poll data from the
1980s and 1990s show that not only did the majority not support decreased government
spending on domestic programs, but it consistently favored more federal spending on education, the environment, health, and the poor. E.g., GEORGE C. EDwARDs III, AT THE MARGINS: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESS 139, 149-57 (1989); BENJAMIN I. PAGE &
ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FiFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY
PREFERENCES 169-70, 373-74 (1992); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s, at 101-10, 123-29 (1991); Shane,
145

146

supra note 93, at 197 & n.156; cf. John Mark Hansen, Individuals, Institutions, and Public
Preferences over Public Finance,92 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 513, 515 tbl.1 (1998) (reporting strong

popular preference for cuts in defense spending but not spending on domestic programs
to lower taxes and balance the budget, and for cutting defense to increase spending on
domestic programs).
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1. An Elaborationon Our Initial Caveat-DeconstructingClaims of
Regulatory Failure
Before offering some preliminary answers to that question, we return to the issue of what constitutes "bad" public policymaking, in order to advocate a more critical dissection of the concept of regulatory
failure.
Others, including Symposium participant Lisa Heinzerling, have
begun to respond to regulatory failure claims by showing that the data
14 7
relied upon are often inaccurate, exaggerated, or poorly analyzed.
This work aims at inducing a healthy skepticism, based on the data itself,
about whether regulatory policy is as inefficient or counterproductive
as critics contend. We wish to suggest another sort of skepticism
about claims of regulatory failure. Cognitive biases can operate as insidiously in the evaluation of regulatory policy as in its design. In particular, the contemporary predilection for toting up the list of regulatory
fiascos (i.e., occasions when government should have known-or,
under public choice assumptions, did know-better than to think that
a certain regulatory policy would further the public good) is an invitation for hindsight bias to run wild. 14
But, one might object, if a regulatory program in fact fails to further its announced social welfare objective, does it matter whether the
147 Heinzerling, supra note 5; Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 5. Other literature
challenging the various regulatory failure stories includes Hillman, supra note 2; and JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, ProtectingEndangeredSpecies Without RegulatingPrivateLandowners: The Case
of EndangeredPlants, 8 CORNELaLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1998).
148 Recent criticism of the choice, in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA),
Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975), to deal with the energy crisis by forcing manufacturers to design more fuel-efficient automobiles is a good example. More than twenty-five
years after the imposition of the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) requirements,
the United States imports a larger percentage of its oil than when the statute was enacted.
Two factors appear to explain this. First, as both higher fuel efficiency and lower gasoline
prices brought down the cost of driving, Americans increased the number of miles driven.
Second, fifty percent of consumer auto purchases now involve minivans, sport-utility vehicles (SUVs), or light trucks, all of which fall within a single regulatory category that was
originally exempted from the most stringent fuel requirements because of concern for
farmers and ranchers who were, back in 1975, their principal consumers. See Hillman,
supra note 2, at 12-14 (recounting details of this situation).
Was the CAFE approach a "bad" government decision in 1975? Only if policymakers
trying to recover from the political and economic chaos caused by the OPEC embargo
should have anticipated (1) that Americans' romance with the road would lead them to
spend all the savings of higher fuel efficiency and lower gas cost on more vehicle miles, and
(2) that the light truck market-traditionally the territory of farmers and ranchers-would
be transformed first by Yuppies whose need to transport their children induced the evolution of van into minivan, and then by Generation Xers whose generous endowment of
money and self-confidence craved the power and invulnerability promised by the SUV.
Blaming those who enacted and implemented EPCA for poor regulatory judgment seems
to us a classic example of the hindsight bias. For an argument that retrospective policy
assessment using the public choice model systematically encourages mischaracterization of
the reasons for regulatory failure, see Farina, supra note 89.
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story told about the failure reflects a cognitive bias or two? We suggest
that it matters a great deal if the objective is improving the quality of
regulatory decisionmaking, rather than discrediting the entire regulatory enterprise. A serious commitment to decreasing the incidence of
regulatory failure requires not only careful verification of the "facts"
of a policy's miscarriage but also careful assessment of the causes.
Regulatory failure sometimes occurs because the initial policy judgment was reasonable but wrong, and refusing to acknowledge the role
of human fallibility in producing bad government decisions is just the
collective version of the egocentric bias. No system of institutional
design will give regulators perfect prescience. Institutional designers
can, however, attempt to build in requirements of data collection and
analysis, as well as incentives for periodic policy reassessment. 149 As
we discuss below, devising effective strategies for overcoming the
"stickiness" of imperfect regulatory decisions turns out to be a particularly difficult challenge for the institutional designer. 150 However, this
challenge will never be met without recognizing that the goal is a process design that facilitates conscious adaptive evolution-i.e., that increases the odds of a program recovering from initial errors (no
matter how reasonable) by becoming smarter.
Finally, a serious commitment to diagnosing the causes of regulatory failure must also include some acknowledgment of operative
democratic constraints. Institutional design (at least, the sort of institutional design we are discussing) is not about trying to short-circuit
democracy. When public policymaking institutions "badly" choose a
second-best strategy because the first-best strategy has been taken off
the table by strongly held public opinion, the policy scientist's regulatory failure may be the political philosopher's success story. 15' Having
said this, we are not suggesting that institutions of democratic governance are, or should be, powerless whenever "good" regulatory choices
149
In other words, although the EPCA approach cannot reasonably be criticized for
not being perfect, it can fairly be criticized for not learning from its mistakes. Whatever
the reasonableness of the original exemption for light trucks, failing to adjust regulatory
strategy to respond to the craze for gas-guzzling SUVs is, indubitably, bad decisionmaking.
150
See infra Part III.B.3.
151
Again, the EPCA is a good example. The "best" regulatory response to the problem of U.S. dependence on foreign oil might be to force consumers to internalize the costs
of such dependence by allowing the market to determine gas prices and vehicle redesign.
However, laissez faire in the face of steeply escalating fuel prices was even less politically
acceptable during the oil embargo than it is today. A comprehensive understanding of
how the CAFE approach emerged as our national regulatory strategy must take into account the policy alternatives that were realistically available. A citizenry that broadly and
firmly resists higher fuel prices may be reasonably pursuing a normative judgment that
allowing the costs of heat and transportation to rise is unacceptably regressive. Or it may
be just foolishly self-indulgent and shortsighted. But responsible regulatory policy critique
should openly acknowledge the tension between technocratic rationality and democratic
responsiveness.
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encounter the political barrier of strongly held public opinion. We do
not believe that policymaking processes should be designed on the
assumption that citizen preferences are endogenous, stable, and immutable. Again, our point is that different species of regulatory failure must be distinguished in order to identify the appropriate design
objective. When it would be "bad" policy to give people what they
want, the institutional designer needs to think about how government
can either (1) facilitate an educational process through which citizens' views might become more enlightened, and/or (2) employ regulatory strategies that dampen or evade the worst effects of harmful
preferences.
We do not mean to imply that this will be easy. Devising strategies for changing or neutralizing unwise collective preferences may
present even more vexed problems for institutional design than overcoming the "stickiness" of imperfect regulatory solutions. Moreover,
deliberate efforts at preference modification raise complex normative
questions about how much government should engage in efforts to
shape, rather than respond to, the will of the people. One thing, however, is certain: For the species of regulatory failure attributable to
government responding to unwise preferences of the citizenry, satisfactory solutions are unlikely to be found if the right questions are not
being asked.
With this caveat against viewing regulatory failure as a generic
problem susceptible to a one-size-fits-all solution, it is possible to outline several general principles and components of a policymaking process that minimizes the damage done by cognitive errors.
2.

The FundamentalInsight: Effectively Allocating Policymaking
Responsibility Between Experts and Lay Decisionmakers

Probably the key insight of the cognitive psychological model is
that the policymaking process should be designed to exploit the distinctive strengths, and compensate for the distinctive weaknesses, of
experts and laypersons. In contemporary administrative government,
this means that setting regulatory policy should be primarily the domain of administrative agencies making judgments through a process
of information-gathering and vetting, within the parameters of legislation that has received full substantive deliberation by Congress and its
committees.
The President and the judiciary should play the important but
decidedly supplementary role of keeping an eye on the experts. They
should be watching for instances in which the expert body fails to tap
its specialized knowledge and decisional competence (e.g., rapidly
passed legislation) or seems to have succumbed to overconfidence
(e.g., a rulemaking record that fails adequately to respond to signifi-
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cant critical comments). They should not mistake themselves for
experts.
Several specific propositions follow from this general allocation
of responsibility.
a. Deference to Congress and Openness to Its Legislative History
Because the cognitive model is far more optimistic about the policymaking capacity of Congress than is the public choice model, it does
not share the latter's hostility to the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. To the extent that legislative materials are written
by committees and others with expertise, they can help convey an expert's view of the underlying policy concerns. 15 2 Of course, courts
152 Justice Scalia, in particular, has expressed concern that committee reports accompanying legislation are more representative of the views of staff than members of Congress.
See, e.g., Hirscheyv. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). From a

public choice perspective, this is a peculiar argument. A model that maintains that "committees are engines of rent-seeking, or the distribution of unjustified benefits to interest
groups," ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 100, at 71, cannot simultaneously complain that members do not keep up with the principal product the committee produces. But, in any event,
Justice Scalia's concern seems overstated.
The role of burgeoning congressional staff has been controversial, e.g., MICHAL J.
MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESEN-

(1980), but the numbers should be kept in perspective: Most of the
increase in personal staff has gone to constituent service, while the bulk of other staff

TATIVE GOVERNMENT

increases reflect growth of support services such as the GAO, see supra note 102. Moreover,
in the 1990s the growth trend reversed, and both personal and committee staff members
declined significantly by the century's end. See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 102, at 126, 132
fig.5-1. It is certainly true that members of Congress do not attend all proceedings of, and
read all documents generated by, each committee and subcommittee to which they belong. Not surprisingly, members of Congress deliberately make choices about the issues
and intensity of their committee engagement, choices that Richard Hall's study of participation in Congress revealed to be variously motivated: "what [active members] variously
want is to serve district interests (service that presumably enhances their reelection
chances), pursue personal policy interests or ideological agendas, or promote the agenda
of a president from their own party." HALL, supra note 16, at 174. Committees have mechanisms for controlling principal-agent problems with staff. See, e.g., Roger H. Davidson,
Wiat Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: ToWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90, 107-08 & nn.37-38 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (not-

ing House Judiciary Committee rule requiring three-day notice to all members prior to
issuance of a proposed report, with opportunity to file supplements or dissents, and Committee on Science and Technology rule restricting post hoc alterations in hearing transcripts). Moreover, the knowledge that fellow legislators will look primarily to committee
reports as background to voting, see supra note 100, provides strong incentives, at least in
major bills, for committee members to monitor the contents of those reports, see McNollgast, LegislativeIntent: The Use of Positive PoliticalTheory in Statutory Interpretation,LAWv & CON-

Winter 1994, at 3, 11 n.23.
The observation that committees and their staffs do most of the legislative
work and that the floor majority rarely inspects all of their efforts implies

TEMP. PROBS.,

nothing about whether the floor majority has abdicated its formal role. If
the floor has created effective incentives for its committees and staff in its
structure and process, it need not constantly monitor their work product to
assure compliance with the interests of the floor majority.
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should not ignore the possibility that legislative history has been surreptitiously doctored by interests that could not succeed openly in the
lawmaking process. 153 Nevertheless, the absolute rejection of legislative history demanded by the strict-textualist movement can undermine the respective institutional strengths of courts and Congress.
In the first place, strict textual interpretation of statutes by judges
is almost guaranteed to create perverse outcomes. Even a Congress
that has fully realized its potential for expertise in drafting a regulatory statute will have difficulty foreseeing, and hence controlling, precisely how the text will function across the gamut of particular
applications to which the statute speaks.15 4 Consequently, strict adherence to text, without a sympathetic attempt to discern and implement the underlying purposes of a statute, is almost certain to
undermine the statutory goals.
In addition, purportedly literalist interpretation almost invariably
155
involves considerable discretion to select among possible meanings.
Although more traditional and eclectic methods of interpretation also
require judicial choices (e.g., how to value and resolve conflicting
items in legislative history), the exercise of discretion in such methods
is undisguised. Hence, it is subject to the discipline of being explained and justified as effective in discerning the legislative purpose.
In contrast, strict textualism wraps judicial discretion in the guise of
'Just" reading the text. Hence, it allows judges to make policy choices
sub rosa,without either the cognitively valuable exercise ofjustification
Id. For a review of the House and Senate rules establishing content and notice requirements for committee reports, see PHILIP P. FmcKEY & STEVEN S. SMITH,JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE LEGISIATIVE PROCESS: SoiE EMPIRICAL AND NoRiATrIvE ASPECrS OF DUE PROCESS OF

LAWMAKING 24-25 (UC Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper

No. 63, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=279433.
153 See, e.g., Devins, supra note 99, at 1184. This concern, another frequent argument
of textualists, may also be overstated: "[B] ecause legislation today often involves numerous
conflicting interest groups, the possibility of 'pulling a fast one' in the legislative history is
somewhat remote. What one group smuggles into the history, other groups have an incentive to find and counter. Thus, competition between interest groups helps keep the system
honest." FARBER & FRiCKEY, supra note 5,at 98 (footnote omitted).
154 Nature has a nasty habit of creating situations in which the applicability of a
statute is unclear. But even if nature were not unkind, the meaning of statutes would still be problematic because language is inherently imprecise
and because rational political actors, having numerous competing ways to
occupy their time, would never devote the effort necessary to minimize the
indeterminacy of statutory language.
McCubbins et al.,
supra note 152, at 13.
155 For a perceptive explication of how textualism is a "more creative, less deferential
style ofjudging," see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994); and WLLIAMi N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRErATiON 42-47, 133-35 (1994). For critique of the indeterminacy of public
choice-inspired textualism in the context of a particular regulatory scheme, see Rand E.

Rosenblatt, Statutory Interpretationand DistributiveJustice: MedicaidHospitalReimbursement and
thw Debate over Public Choice, 35 ST. Louis U. LJ. 793, 807-14 (1991).
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or the restraining mindset of a faithful agent seeking to implement
1 56
the goals of the legislative principal.
To be sure, appropriate use of legislative history can be a challenge
for courts. It is often fragmentary, sometimes conflicting, and always
potentially tilted by the views of congressional outliers. Nevertheless,
it is a potential window into expert assessment of the problem that the
statute attempts to address. As such, cognitive theory provides theoretical support for more traditional styles of interpretation: Legislative
history is a tool judges should thoughtfully employ, not reject out-ofhand in favor of a literalist approach that too easily camouflages inexpert judicial policymaking.1

b.

57

The Potential Value of External Review

External review of administrative agencies has become a fixture
of the modern administrative state. Judicial review, particularly since
the procedural enhancement of notice-and-comment rulemaking and
the correlative emergence of hard-look review in the 1970s, is a significant final step in the adoption of most significant regulatory policy.
More recently, a series of Executive Orders, the details of which have
varied with administration, have required executive agencies to submit their regulatory agendas and proposed major rules to the OMB,
specifically the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
158
for intensive White House review.
From a psychological perspective, processes for external review fit
the model of sensible governance well. Agency experts are allocated
the task of drafting detailed substantive policy, but their proposals
must be examined by another entity (or entities) with a different perspective on the underlying problem. Such examination can counter156
Cf Merrill, supra note 155, at 373 (arguing that textualism is inconsistent with the
model of the courts as "faithful agents of the politically accountable branches").
157 As Professors Farber and Frickey note, the best advocates of traditional approaches,

such as Henry Hart and Henry Friendly, have had a sophisticated understanding of the
need "to sort the wheat from the chaff," FARBER & FRicKEV, supra note 5, at 99, and have
taken a carefully nuanced approach to the use of legislative history, see id. at 99-100. For a
very different sort of effort to identify when and how to use legislative history, see Devins,
supra note 99, at 1213 (suggesting a model in which judicial deference would be contingent on identifying "the circumstances in which Congress has the incentives to take
factfinding seriously"); and McNollgast, supra note 152 (using positive political theory to
suggest ways in which courts can separate meaningful evidence about legislation's intended effects from "cheap talk" that should be disregarded). Cf FRIGc
& SMITH, supra
note 152, at 29 (warning that "when [as is often the case in Congress] policy is ... constructed through a competitive process of coalition building, bargaining, and voting," it is
unrealistic to expect "that inherently political process" to conform to the model of "a hypothetical rational policy-making process").
158 The independent agencies have been exempt from these requirements. See Lessig
& Sunstein, supra note 78, at 107 & n.438 (arguing that this exemption is neither constitutionally required nor sound).
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act the overconfidence and tunnel vision of expertise without
displacing the primary role of experts in policy formulation.
In theory, OMB review and judicial review are sound complements. Ideally, the former allows a technically sophisticated vetting of
the agency's analysis before a group of examiners sufficiently adept to
understand it but uninvested, either personally or professionally, in
the particular proposal. Again ideally, the latter brings the lay perspective back into the policymaking process: As the culmination of the
notice-and-comment process, it pushes the agency to articulate the
relevant decisional factors, engage in some perceptible assessment of
alternative courses of action, and respond to meaningful comments by
outsiders. The question is whether the actual practice of 0MB review
and judicial review sufficiently matches the ideal to realize the potential benefits of external review.
With respect to OMB review, the practice has varied across administrations. Regulatory review under the Reagan Administration
differed in very significant ways from review under the Clinton Administration. 159 (During the intervening Bush Administration, OIRA had
become the focus of a Democratic Congress's displeasure and, as appointment of a new director became mired in political stalemate,
principal responsibility for regulatory review shifted to the Council on
Competitiveness.) 160 Assessments of OMB's performance over time
are, not surprisingly, conflicting. 16 1 Still, it appears reasonably safe to
say that the agency's effectiveness in providing technically sophisticated external review was compromised whenever it was perceived as
engaged in the very different function of reviewing policy proposals
for conformity with the President's political or ideological agenda.
This perception was highest in the first term of the Reagan Administration and abated somewhat in the Clinton Administration. 162 In any
159

See SHELLEY

LYNNE

TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE PRESIDENT'S

BUDGET OFFICE 184-90, 196-283 (1998); Shane, supra note 93, at 174-92.
160 TOMKIN, supra note 159, at 213-16; Shane, supra note 93, at 167-68.
161
See, e.g., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY. FEDERAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE 1990s (1988); NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., REVITALIZING FEDERAL MANAGEMENT: MANAGERS AND THEIR OVERBURDENED SYSTEMS (1983); Christopher C. DeMuth &

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Wite House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1075
(1986); E. Donald Elliott, TQjV-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order
12,291 Works Poorly and TWhat PresidentClinton Should Do About It, LAW & CoNmEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1994, at 167; Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interferencewith Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1995); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political
Oversight and the Deteriorationof Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994).
162
See THOMAS 0. McGARrm, REINVENTING RATIONALITY. THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 286-87 (1991) (reporting "a strong sense among
most agency analysts that a good analysis will not save a decision with which [Reagan-era]

OMB disagrees and a poor analysis will not slow down a decision with which OMB agrees");
TOMVIN, supra note 159, at 95, 102, 210, 216, 220-21, 256-57; Matthew Holden, Jr., Why
EntouragePolitics is Volatile, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 61, 75 (re-
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event, the pattern of staffing OIRA with "'desk officers,' who are typically young economists, lawyers, or policy analysts with little prior experience in government or with the programs they oversee," 163 seems
ill-suited to providing technically adept expert review. 164
Some commentors have argued vehemently that OMB pressure
on agencies to conform to the President's policy agenda is a thoroughly appropriate-indeed, highly desirable-infusion of democratic control into regulatory decisionmaking a65 Others have as
vigorously disputed the claim that presidential elections represent a
regulatory policy mandate from the people that is carried out through
White House review. 166 We take no position, in this Article, on that
debate. We simply observe that whatever the democratic value of review designed to achieve ideological or political influence over the
regulatory policy process, such review is unlikely simultaneously to realize the potential of external review to catch and correct the cogni167
tive illusions of agency experts.
In sum, although the White House is a thoroughly sensible location for evaluating proposed policy for consistency with the President's political and ideological agenda, it may not be the best locus
for a technically sophisticated review process aimed at countering the
168
cognitive errors of agency experts.
porting agency perceptions that the Reagan OMB sided with and passed information along
to industrial interests, and was "'vindictive'" towards dissenting agencies); Terry M. Moe,
The Politicized Presidency, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 135, 151-52

(describing the role that "a new OMB unit, staffed by presidential partisans" played in the
Reagan Administration's strategy for controlling regulatory policymaking).
163
Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialManagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 533, 557 (1989).
164
See HAHN, supra note 1, at 32 (analyzing OMB's own data to conclude that OIRA
review did not have a significant effect on the cost-effectiveness of regulations); McGARIuY,
supra note 162, at 281 (reporting agencies' "almost uniformly negative" assessment of technical quality of OIRA staff analyses); WrALTER WILLIAMS, MISMANAGING AMERICA: THE RISE OF
THE ANTI-ANALYrIc PRESIDENCY 4-8, 94-95 (1990) (concluding that, because of OIRA staff
members' administrative and programmatic inexperience, agencies often produced better
analyses than it did); Shapiro, supra note 161, at 24 (criticizing the technical quality of
OMB review because responsible staff "have had little or no scientific or technical expertise"; moreover, OMB did not reliably counter agency myopia because "lack of expertise
and experience" and "distrust of the agencies they were reviewing" caused reviewers to miss
important issues and fight about unimportant ones).
165
See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 161; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 78, at
102-03, 106-07.
166
See, e.g., Farina, supra note 77; Shane, supra note 93, at 197-200.
167
Cf ROCKMAN, supra note 106, at 207 (noting the "conflict between... pervasive
presidential centrism . . . on the one hand, and knowledgeable decision making, on the

other," and observing that, in administrations that emphasize strong presidential control
over policymaking, decisions are then "imposed to be legitimized and accepted by experts
rather than to be shaped by them or sharply debated between them").
168
Cf ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LITAN, IMPROVING REGULATION: START WITH THE
ANALYSIS AND WORK FROM THERE, TEsTIMoNY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY
REFORM AND PAPERWORK REDUCrION, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINEss 7 (AEI-Brook-
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There are other design options. Congress can legislate in external evaluation as part of specific regulatory programs; versions of this
strategy currently exist in some environmental and safety regulation. 16 9 Proposals to implement a generally applicable requirement of
peer review have played a prominent role in recent regulatory reform
bills. 170 A related strategy, which shares some of the cognitive virtues
of external review, is legal requirements that the agency consider
some factor outside the normal range of its expertise (e.g., environmental impact) during the decisional process. Such requirements
force the agency to adopt a different perspective, helping it to tran17 1
scend the myopia and overconfidence that experts may experience.
Apart from such externally imposed obligations, agencies themselves have sometimes recognized the value of expert review and voluntarily incorporated it into their decisionmaking. 172 A related
strategy involves the agency deliberately dividing responsibility for policy formation among staff from different internal subunits. Sometimes these staff work as a team on a model of collaborative,
interdisciplinary decisionmaking; other times, a more confrontational
relationship-on the model of the Kennedy national security team-

ings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Testimony No. 00-1, 2000) (recommending that
Congress create "a congressional office of regulatory analysis . . . or a separate agency
outside of the executive branch" to check the regulatory analysis done by OIRA), available
at http://wwiv.aei.brookings.org/publications/testimony/testimony_0oI1.pdf.
169
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136w(e) (1994) (EPA; pesticide studies); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i) (13) (1994) (certain Superfund studies); 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission; reactor licensing); 49 U.S.C. § 44912(c) (1994) (Federal
Aviation Administration; antiterrorist strategies).
170 E.g., Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. (1999); Science
Integrity Act, H.R 574, 106th Cong. (1999); seeFred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement
Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENvrL. L. &
PoL'v F. 89 (2000). For useful discussion of the current interest in peer review, as well as
thoughtful assessment of how external review could be integrated into the existing practices of administrative decisionmaking so as to "help administrative agencies aspire to the
deliberative ideal recently espoused by civic republican scholars," see Lars Noah, Scientific
"Republicanism".Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.
1033, 1034-37 (2000).
171
See, e.g, STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY.
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 120-24 (4th ed. 2000) (reviewing the effect of the new forms
of executive control of agencies).
172 For discussion of the voluntary use of outside experts by agencies, see, for example,

Noah, supra note 170, at 1034, 1049 (EPA, FDA); and Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and
the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 63-69 (1990) (discussing several agencies responsible for regulating biotechnology). See generally BRUCE L.R. SMITH, THE ADVISERS:
SCIENTISTs IN THE POLICY PROCESS 1 (1992) (estimating that scientific advisory panels constitute about half of the approximately one thousand federal advisory committees used by
the executive branch); SHIELAJASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYNLKaRs (1990) (discussing growing impact of expert advisory committees on regulatory
decisions).
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is created. 173 The common element, though, is bringing diverse perspectives to bear in decisionmaking. Such self-generated agency use of
external and internal strategies for multiplying professional perspectives is highly desirable. One of the cognitive model's prime contributions is its ability to provide a framework for understanding decisional
error that minimizes defensiveness-thereby increasing policymakers'
willingness to take steps to improve their own decisional processes. By
explaining such steps as sensible de-biasing strategies, rather than correctives for incompetence or checks against self-serving behavior, the
model encourages an agency to build them into its policymaking pro174
cess at the points where they can do the most good.
With respect to judicial review, a lively debate continues about
17 5
the extent to which judicial ideology colors the practice of review.
We make no attempt to resolve this empirical question here. Rather,
we simply observe that (as we have previously explained, 176 and as is
further developed in Mark Seidenfeld's paper 77) hard-look review is
well designed, from a cognitive perspective, to serve a debiasing function. Moreover, the judiciary seems the best institutional location for
this function.
Whether the practice ofjudicial review realizes its theoretical potential depends, in the end, on whetherjudges heed the long-standing
professional norms against substituting their judgment for that of the
agency-and, perhaps, on whether appointing presidents resist the
temptation to mold the judiciary into another avenue for pursuing
ideological control over regulation. The cognitive model provides
strong additional support for these norms, and underscores the value
of conscious judicial self-discipline in this area. Just as it can function
to reorient an agency's thinking about the value of external review, so
too the psychological model can help ajudge apprehend the natureand the limits-of what she can add to the regulatory policymaking
process.

173 Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & CorTErtp.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57, 90-94, 99-102. For an extraordinarily thoughtful assessment
(supported by case studies) of the strengths and weaknesses of various models agencies use
to conduct regulatory analysis in the policymaking process, see McGAIT, supra note 162,
at 191-267.
174
Cf Elliott, supra note 161, at 169 (observing that when OMB review did raise important issues, it happened "very late in the process, when it is virtually impossible to do anything productive about them").
175 For a recent review of the literature on this point, see Revesz, supra note 72, at
1105-15.
176 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
177 Seidenfeld, supra note 143.
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c.

Skepticism About "Presidentializing"Regulatory Policymaking

The most significant structural reform of regulation advocated by
contemporary administrative law scholars is enhancing the role of the
President in regulatory decisionmaking 78 The cognitive model
raises serious doubts about whether centralizing decisional control in
the President is likely to improve the quality of regulatory policy.
The President is the most overworked and underinformed decisionmaker in the American policymaking system. 17 9 Bombarded with
a breadth and depth of data that no human brain could effectively
verify and process, he epitomizes the need to allocate scarce cognitive
resources efficiently. The optimal institutional role for the President
is to make decisions that must necessarily occur rapidly and decisively
on whatever information is at hand. Attempting to involve him significandy in the range of policy decisions that can be more deliberative is
likely to be inefficiently distracting and substantively
counterproductive.
We recognize that many current proposals for increased presidential control over regulatory policy are based on the conviction that
the President is the decisionmaker least susceptible to factional influence and most likely to represent the views of the national majority.18 0
Whether or not this conviction is empirically well founded, from the
psychological perspective, the proposal is positively perverse. The design of regulatory government in an increasingly global era should
concentrate on husbanding the Chief Executive's cognitive resources,
not further overextending them.
178

See, e.g, Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245 (2001)

(arguing that presidential control of administrative action advances the core values of accountability and effectiveness); accord Calabresi, supra note 70; Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 78.
179 Presidential scholar Hugh Heclo compellingly captured the myth and reality of the
modem American presidency:
Our most familiar image of the presidency finds a man, sitting alone, in the
dimly lit Oval Office. Against this shadowy background the familiar face
ponders that ultimate expression of power, a presidential decision.
It is a compelling and profoundly misleading picture. Presidential decisions are obviously important. But a more accurate image would show a
presidency composed of at least a thousand people-a jumble of personal
loyalists, professional technocrats, and bureaucratic staff with one man
struggling, often vainly, to stay abreast of it all. What that familiar face
ponders in the Oval Office is likely to be a series of conversations with advisers or a few pages of paper containing several options. These represent the
last distillates produced from immense rivers of information flowing from
sources-and condensed in ways-about which the president probably
knows little.
Heclo, supra note 104, at 34.
180 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 178, at 2361 (noting that "the President's concern for
maintaining the support of a national constituency... should curb the extent to which he
attends only to narrow interests"); supra note 78.
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The psychological model similarly cautions against the related
trend of "presidentializing the bureaucracy."' 8 1 Pursued most aggressively in the first Reagan Administration, the goal has been to extend
presidential influence over delegated regulatory decisionmaking
through a strategy in which "the bureaucracy... is to be either shortcircuited or penetrated by the White House.' 82 The strategy has relied on three elements: (1) increasing the number of political appointees within regulatory agencies; (2) displacing the historical discretion
of cabinet secretaries to make subcabinet level appointments in their
agencies with direct White House control over noncareer appointments; and (3) emphasizing, in those appointment decisions, personal and ideological loyalty to the President over expertise and
management credentials. 18 3 Political scientists and scholars of public
administration who study this trend have pointed out that the goal of
"direction (the political impetus)" can diminish institutional access to
84
"knowledge (the civil servant's know-how to make things work)."'
"Presidentializing the bureaucracy has often meant the downgrading
of expert professional advice in resolving policy questions"185-a shift
in decisionmaking responsibility that has consequences both for the

181

The phrase comes from Francis Rourke, Presidentializingthe Bureaucracy:From Ken-

nedy to Reagan, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 123.
182 RocKMAN, supra note 106, at 207.

183 See Patricia W. Ingraham, PoliticalDirection and Policy Change in Three FederalDepartments, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 180, 181; Pfiffner, supra note 105,
at 12-15; see also Aberbach & Rockman, supra note 111, at 161-62 ("More and more, however, what the White House wants of civil servants, as ex-White House aide... John Ehrlichman so picturesquely put it, is the following: 'When we sayjump, the answer should be
"how high?"'"); Moe, supra note 162, at 151 (describing the systematic replacement of career staff with loyalist appointees in the Reagan Administration); James P. Pfiffner, Political
Appointees and CareerExecutives: The Democracy-BureaucracyNexus, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 104, at 167, 171 (describing advice in Heritage Foundation manual for
Reagan political appointees on how to block career staff access to information and minimize their role in policy formation).
184 Roc'Ax-N, supra note 106, at 235. Professor Rockman goes on to conclude:
The administrative presidency, first proclaimed under Nixon and greatly
amplified under Reagan, however, is not the reciprocal relationship [between direction and knowledge] urged by Heclo. Instead, it is an imposed
set of controls (personnel and organizational) deriving from the White
House designed to deny, rather than make use of, the skills and experience
of the career civil service.
Id.
185 Rourke, supra note 181, at 134.
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substance of public policy and administration 8 6 and for personnel
87
management.1
In contrast to the legal academy's predilection for improving government performance by increasing presidentialization, scholars in
these other disciplines tend to urge a balance between political direction and bureaucratic expertise-with a strong concern that recent
administrations have too much devalued the role of the latter in policymaking.' 8 8 Cognitive theory suggests that, in this area, the political
scientists and public administrators may have the better argument.
3.

Challengesfor InstitutionalDesign: "Stickiness" of Imperfect
Solutions and Unwise Citizen Preferences

The cognitive-psychological theory also highlights important impediments to sensible regulation that might otherwise go unnoticed
or misanalyzed. Notably, framing effects' 8 9 provide an explanation
for the "stickiness" of some regulatory programs. 190 As scholars and
public commentators have noted, regulatory programs often long outlast their usefulness.' 9 ' The Interstate Commerce Commission, for
186 See, e.g., RocKwAN, supra note 106, at 236 (noting that "inattentiveness to the perspectives of career personnel jeopardizes effectiveness in government, unless the operational definition of effectiveness is government by presidential fiat"); Heclo, supra note
104, at 41 ("Political staff work tends to drive out longer-term, institutional interests in
policy and administration."); Patricia W. Ingraham, Building Bridges or Burning Them? The
President, the Appointees, and the Bureaucracy,47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 425, 432 (1987) (concluding that the presidentialization trend has led not to more political control, but to a management void); Rourke, supra note 181, at 134 ("While to many observers, this decline in
the influence of bureaucrats over executive policy making may be a welcome development,
it should be remembered that bureaucrats frequently provide the best-informed and most
disinterested advice available for coping with major issues of domestic and foreign policy."); see also

COLIN CAMPBELL, MANAGING THE PRESIDENCY. CARTER, REAGAN, AND THE
SEARCH FOR ExECurvE HARMONY 19 (1986) ("Politicizedincompetence results when exception-

ally partisan, ideological, and/or egocentric presidents choose to ignore the state apparatus and do whatever they can get away with politically.").
187
For concerns about problems with morale, recruiting, and retention of talented
career personnel in this sort of environment, see, for example, Pfiffner, supra note 183, at
177-79; Elliot L. Richardson, Civil Servants: Mhy Not the Best?, WALL ST.J., Nov. 20, 1987, at
A28.
188 A good summary of this viewpoint comes from Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman:
Politics provides energy and revitalization while bureaucracy brings continuity, knowledge, and stability. One can exist without the other but only
to the detriment of effective government. The problem for government
and, in our view, the public interest is not to have one of these values completely dominate the other, but to provide a creative dialogue or synthesis
between the two. In recent times the dialogue has turned into monologue
as deinstitutionalization and centrist command have grown apace.
Aberbach & Rockman, supranote 111, at 163 (footnote omitted).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
190 See generally FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 5, at 47-55 (discussing stability of
legislation).
191 See Joseph P. Tomain, networkindustries.gov.reg,48 U. KAN. L.REv. 829, 844-45
(2000) (discussing regulatory cycles).
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example, continued to exist for many years after Congress withdrew
the core of its regulatory authority. 192 Similarly, the Tennessee Valley
Authority continued constructing dams well after all of the useful dam
sites had been developed.' 9 3 As a related problem, some regulatory
programs remain "stuck" with initial design flaws long after commen194
tators and legislators become aware of them.
Public choice theory has difficulty explaining regulatory "stickiness." If regulatory agencies are occupied by self-serving actors, those
actors will attempt to continue their missions, regardless of the utility
for the public. But the officials who occupy agencies are unlikely to
have enough at stake to be effective lobbyists. The benefits of a government job with a regulatory agency that has outlived its usefulness
surely cannot be blamed for the chronic stickiness of regulatory programs. A more plausible, but still troublesome, account would blame
stickiness on the beneficiaries of the regulatory program. 1 95 Even a
maladaptive, misaligned program benefits some interest group. An
unneeded weapons system, for example, confers great benefits on the
contractor who continues to construct it. Public choice theorists
sometimes argue that the beneficiaries of unnecessary programs become entrenched and difficult for reformers to dislodge.1 96 The
troublesome aspect of this account of stickiness, however, is that rational actors should treat losses as just as important as forgone gains.
The beneficiaries of the reform should be able to lobby just as hard as
those who would oppose reform. In fact, if the reform produces a
more efficient program, then reform advocates have more to gain
than opponents. 19 7 Surely legislators and interest groups would not
easily tolerate forgoing an opportunity to create some social gains that
can be allocated into private hands.
Cognitive psychology provides some answers for this dilemma.
Because of framing effects, people treat forgone gains as less important than losses. 198 If framing applies to interest group politics, then
those who might lose the benefits of an existing program will fight
192

See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 13-14 (4th ed. 2000).

193

See

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING

WATER 174, 441 (1986).

194 See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 232-33 (1993).
195 For example, existing industries are often identified as obstacles to reform of environmental laws, inasmuch as they are thought to be happy with the status quo. See id. at
230-34.
196 See id.
197 To be sure, existing interest groups might be more organized, and therefore more
effective, than interest groups that benefit from a regulation that has yet to be implemented. But it hardly seems that this could be a universal phenomenon.
198 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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harder than those who stand to benefit from its reform. 199 Similarly,
the allocation of benefits can create a sense of entitlement, an "endowment effect." 200 If those affected by a regulatory program "en20 1
dow" the status quo, then the status quo will likely remain in place.
Furthermore, as to programs that are failing to accomplish their
intended goals, legislators and regulators may suffer from a problem
that psychologists call escalating commitment. 20 2 Those who initially
advocate a program or a position tend to cling to the success of the
position long after it becomes apparent it will fail. 203 As noted earlier,
banks separate loan officers from workout officers because loan officers tend to continue to believe in their initial decision to invest after
it has become imprudent to hope that loans will be repaid. 20 4 People
find it difficult to come to believe that their initial decisions were mistaken. They escalate their commitment to projects because they
20 5
If
would otherwise find it difficult to explain their initial decisions.
escalating commitment affects legislators, then the initial advocates of
a regulatory program are apt to resist reform efforts.
The phenomena of framing and escalating commitment suggest
that the solution to regulatory stickiness lies in devising procedures
that address the psychological attachment policymakers and the public have to the status quo. Adding sunset clauses to statutes, for exam20 6
ple, shifts the status quo, thereby undoing any endowment effect.
Time-triggered automatic reversals of the status quo, however, may be
too drastic a solution for many regulatory contexts. Sensible and efficient regulation may be lost because of the enormous political difficulty involved in enacting any legislation. Moreover, even the
possibility of such periodic upheaval in regulatory requirements
would create instability and foment undesirable strategic behavior. As
a less drastic alternative, a statutory requirement of periodic revieweither by the legislature or an agency--might help insure that revision
is part of the psychological mix. 20 7 On the other hand, it is probably a
mistake to endow a statute with a pool of money or source of funding
199
200

201
202
203
204
205

206

See Sunstein, supra note 194, at 230-34.
See id. at 230.
See id. at 230-34.
See Staw, supra note 60, at 41-42.
Id.

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Stay, supra note 60, at 41-42.
For example, the independent counsel statute might still be a part of American law

if it had not included a sunset clause. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-521, sec. 601(a), § 598, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873.
207 For example, the Clean Air Act requires that the EPA review its ambient air quality
standards every five years, and update them, if necessary. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2) (B)
(1994).
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for a long (or even indefinite) period of time. 20 8 The potential for
annual revision through the appropriations process may serve a similar function to a mandatory periodic substantive review.
The principal challenge in devising institutional designs for dealing with stickiness is that we have little experience, and even less data,
about how such procedures work in practice. In this area, cognitive
theory can give new insights into the problem, but solutions require
further experimentation.
Similarly, psychology can help illuminate the conflict that occurs
in some regulatory areas between democratic responsiveness and technocratic rationality, but the cognitive model does not yet suggest clear
strategies for resolving such conflicts. The public, more so than the
governmental actors that are the subject of this Article, is apt to rely
on simple heuristics and schema that lead to mistaken judgments
about what is dangerous. 20 9 Interest groups may find ways to take advantage of the cognitive errors that plague layjudgment. 21 0 In a democratic society, some of these unwise citizen preferences naturally
translate into public policy, even though that policy might be demonstrably foolish.
Despite a growing body of scholarship on the subject, the role of
government policymakers in responding to the discrepancy between
public fears and real problems has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
Some argue that public education is the key to reducing the errors of
the public. 2 1 1 However, errors such as those that typically attend lay
risk perception do not arise from a lack of information; they arise
from the ways that information is processed. 212 Consequently, public
education campaigns are not likely to resolve this problem. Nor is it
clear that governmental officials should dismiss the fears of the public
just because they can be traced to defects in judgment. Wholly apart
from the practical political reality that officials cannot ignore the public and consistently win reelection, the fear that the public feels about
some risks is a very real psychological state.
Again, the principal contribution of the cognitive model, at this
point, is to highlight where additional work must be done. By defining the problem in a very different way than public choice, the psychological model poses a very different research agenda.
208 This was the case with the initial Superfund program. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a)
(1994).
209

See STEPHEN BREVER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGuLA-

TION 33-39 (1993).

210 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 733-35.
211
See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 595-98 (1992).
212 See id. at 605-10.
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IV
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON WHY THE CHOICE OF
MODEL MATTERS

If a society assumes its politicians are venal, stupid or self-serving, it will

attractto its public life as an ongoing self-fulfilling prophecy the greedy, the
knavish and the dim.
21 3
-A. Bartlett Giamatti
We have argued here that the cognitive model deserves attention
from administrative law scholars because it can provide both descriptive and normative insights into the design of regulatory institutionsinsights that are in many ways superior to those offered by public
choice. In closing, we want to make a different sort of argument
about why the choice of model matters.
At some point during the remarkable twentieth-century expansion of regulatory government, administrative law became disconnected from public administration. Those who studied and critiqued
the rules, processes, and institutions of regulation had little intellectual interchange with those who studied and critiqued the organizational behavior and human resource management of regulatory
government. With few exceptions, 214 modern administrative law
scholars paid scant attention to the corps of people who actually apply
the rules, undertake the processes, and cause the institutions to
function.
Public choice theory changed all that by emphatically putting the
human being back into regulation. Interest-maximizing rational man
became the mainspring of regulatory government, his self-serving behavior both explaining what is, and determining what will be.
We share the belief of public choice theorists that anyone interested in the success of regulation must take very seriously the nature
and characteristics of the human beings who constitute regulatory
government. However, we suggest that, having rediscovered that people matter a great deal in the design of regulatory programs, administrative law must also consider the extraordinarily counterproductive
potential of employing a model of government in which self-interested behavior is the normal state of affairs.
Psychologists have long recognized the phenomenon of the selffulfilling prophecy: Human actors are affected by their perceptions of
what others expect of them. Data from a number of studies and a
variety of contexts confirm that an individual's behavior and performA. BARTLET GIANiA-r, THE UNIvERsrrY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 168 (1981).
Among the most prominent of which must be the work of Symposium participant
Jerry Mashaw. E.g., JERRY L. MAsHANW, BuREAucRAnc JuSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURrIY
213

214

DIsAmLrny CLAms (1983).
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ance can depend, in important ways, on what signals she receives from
her social environment about her presumed motives and competence.2 1 5 In other words, while we may not always get what we deserve
from the people around us, we often get what we expect.
The public choice model of rent-seeking interest groups and constituent-pandering officials might perhaps be seen, within the intellectual history of modern American political theory, as a needed antidote
to uncritical assumptions of government by public-interested public
servants. 216 Designing government programs as if those with power
never put their own interests ahead of the public good would be dangerously utopian. But in fact, of course, neither the public choice
story nor the public interest story gets human motivation completely
right. In government, as in most of the rest of life, selfishness and
selflessness appear side by side-sometimes in the same person. If the
truth about motive really is a protean mix of good, bad, and muddled
intentions on the part of the myriad human actors who ultimately are
regulatory government, then relentless cynicism about those in power
is equally dangerous. Observations about human vulnerability to selffulfilling prophecies warn that a formally endorsed, widely promulgated model of civic behavior which blames bad outcomes on the inevitability of greedy, self-serving action might itself become outcome
determinative.
Therefore, while we recognize that psychological insights into
human judgment are, in themselves, indifferent to motivation-heuristic errors and cognitive biases can trip up Homo economicus as readily
as Publius-we believe that the cognitive model offers most promise
as an alternative, rather than a complement, to the public choice account.2 1 7 An account of government that features policymakers who

attempt to reach public-regarding outcomes but who must overcome a
number of cognitive traps, can potentially make three unique
contributions:

215

ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER

EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968); Claude M. Steele, A Threat

in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape IntellectualIdentity and Performance, 52 AM. PsYCHOLOGIST 613
(1997).
216
"It is not for nothing that the rational-actor tradition has as its chief declared enemy the benevolent-despot conception of government." Geoffrey Brennan, Democratic
Trust. A Rational-Choice Theory View, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 197, 215-16 (Valerie
Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).

217 See generally Rachlinski, supra note 25 (arguing for the importance of cognitive psychological analysis in law). Cf Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 67, at 645-47 (proposing
that cognitive theory is best deployed as a supplement to public choice and other theory).
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1. Supporting and Enhancing the Profession of Government
Service
First, it can be used by those attempting to produce a cadre of
public officials inculcated with professional norms of competence,
dedication, and responsibility for the public-regarding use of
2 18
power.
In the 1999 Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Matthew Holden, Jr. warned his colleagues of "the
folly of recruiting and helping to educate human beings and at the
same time pummeling them into conscious disdain for what they
do." 219 A model of civic behavior built around the rational maximizer

who adeptly pursues his self-interest at the expense of others is useless
to those attempting to recruit talented people to government, train
them to contribute effectively as part of a team of public-regarding
decisionmakers, and create a working environment in which job satisfaction and morale are high enough to retain them. As Lynn Stout
220
aptly puts it, "[H omo economicus is a sociopath."
By contrast, modeling the well-intentioned but cognitively vulnerable decisionmaker as the norm--with the self-serving actor relegated
to the role of real, but explicitly deviant, possibility-provides the
kind of context in which public-spirited motivation can be professionally reinforced. Reviewing the empirical evidence on the phenomenon of other-regarding preferences, Professor Stout concludes:
"People can be motivated to adopt other-regarding norms; to follow
norms even when they have no external incentives to do so; and to
enforce norms against others even when this is personally costly. But
218 Those who doubt whether anyone still takes such a notion seriously might consider
the recent revival of public ethics scholarship, including Louis C. GAWTHROP, PUBLIC SERFOR THE 21sr CENTURY (1998) (considering, in
an era when government is being reinvented in an entrepreneurial mold, the relationship
of morality and ethics for "those who choose a career in the service of democracy"); JOHN
A. ROHR, PUBLIC SERVICE, ETHics, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (1998) (discussing the
role of the career civil servant as "citizens in lieu of the rest of us," and identifying ways in
which constitutional "regime values" can inform exercises of bureaucratic discretion);
MONTGOMERY VAN WART, CHANGING PUBLIC SECTOR VALUES (1998) (identifying five value
sources for public administration drawn from, inter alia, the moral development work of
Lawrence Kohlberg and the organization culture work of R.E. Quinn andJ. Rohrbaugh).
"Questions of morality and right conduct in public affairs are now considered to be as
significant as the traditional [efficiency] concerns of Wilsonian Public Administration."
Jeremy F. Plant, Using Codes of Ethics in Teaching PublicAdministration, in TEACHING ETHICS
AND VALUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PROGRAMS 161, 161-62 (James S. Bowman & Donald C. Menzel eds., 1998).
219 Matthew Holden, Jr., The Competence of Political Science: "Progress in Political
Research" Revisited, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association (1999),
vicE AND DEMOCRACY. ETHICAL IMPERATIVEv

in 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1, 1 (2000).
220
LYNN STOUT, OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL NoRms 19 (Georgetown

Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 265902, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.tafabstractid=265902.
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they can only be motivated to do these things when the social conditions are favorable." 2 21 Two of the most important conditions are: (1)
signaling, by respected sources of authority, that other-regarding behavior is expected; and (2) promoting the perception that others also
conform to altruistic norms. 222 A model of government predicated
upon public-regarding actors, struggling to make good public policy
choices while facing predictable vulnerabilities to judgmental error,
can help create both of these conditions.
2.

Improving Performance Through Understanding

Second, such a model can improve the performance of regulatory decisionmaking institutions. Because of its compatibility with a
process of professional training and enculturation, it can serve as the
basis for developing practices of self-reflective professional critiquei.e., efforts within the organizationitself to recognize and address shared
cognitive vulnerabilities that can undermine even the best intentions
if not addressed.
More broadly, the model can be used as the framework for explaining decisionmaking rules and protocols in a way that both lowers
resistance to their implementation and increases their effectiveness.
If there is one lesson that institutional designers should have learned
from the past thirty years' experience with proceduralizing regulatory
decisionmaking, it is the fact that few, if any, administrative processes
or structures are proof against determined subversion. 2 23 Even if the
letter of a required decisional protocol is met, its spirit can almost
invariably be defeated by an unsympathetic decisionmaker.
For this reason, the why of institutional design can matter as
much as the what. A society that tells its regulators that they must
engage in a public notice-and-comment process and then submit their
reasoning process to review by a panel of judges, because this will
stymie their own self-interested instincts and thwart the rent-seeking
tendencies of the various groups who bid for their favors, can hardly
be surprised if informal rulemaking degenerates into a costly war of
attrition. Suppose, instead, that a society tells its regulators that external review is important because all human judgment, and particularly
221
222

Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-31. See also ROBERT D.

PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVI-

legal
compliance and similar other-regarding behavior, of belief that others are behaving
accordingly).
223
Cf MAsHAxW, supra note 5, at 154 (positing a "'Law of Conservation of Administrative Discretion'" under which the amount of discretion in a system is constant and
"[e] limination of discretion at one choice point merely causes the discretion that had been
exercised there to migrate elsewhere in the system"); STOUT, supra note 220, at 19-21 (exploring why external forces alone will not be sufficient to control all selfish behavior).
VAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 347-48 (2000) (discussing the importance, to voluntary
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the judgment of experts, is vulnerable to certain cognitive biases
which this procedure, as the culmination of a process of public vetting
and explanation, can help counteract. This explanation-the core of
which is shared fallibility rather than individual venality-permits regulators to see themselves as dedicated and talented stewards of the
public trust who are part of a collective enterprise of deploying regulatory power as wisely as humanly possible. Moreover, it facilitates their
"hearing," with less defensiveness, the feedback provided by the process-feedback that can represent important information for improv224
ing expert decisional competence.
Agency personnel are not the only actors whose motives and behavior may be affected by the nature of the reasons advanced for particular decisionmaking rules and protocols. If the dominant
intellectual theory of regulatory policymaking is one of capture by
rent-seeking interest groups and control by pork-producing legislatures, it should come as no surprise ifjudges (and, perhaps as important, their law clerks educated in elite law schools) wield hard-look
review with a vengeance. By contrast, if judges are educated in the
respective strengths and vulnerabilities of expert and lay decisionmaking, this explanation will inform and reinforce the adjuration that judicial review is to be "searching and careful," but that "[t] he court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. '225
3.

Shaping Public Perception

Finally, such a model might be useful, to some modest degree, in
shifting citizens' perception of their government. This is the most
speculative contribution but also, perhaps, the most important.
American public opinion reflects deeply paradoxical reactions to
the modem administrative state. Americans tend to be ideologically
libertarian and operationally New Dealist: they don't like big government, but they want more government attention to specific social and
economic problems; they don't like federal regulation, but they want
more environmental, consumer, and safety protection. 226 Such contradictory impulses help explain how Ronald Reagan could be elected
and reelected on an antigovernment, antiregulatory platform by a citizenry who continued to express support for the very environmental,
2 27
economic, and social-welfare regulatory programs that he targeted.
224

225
226

See supraPart I.B (discussing role of feedback in improving expert performance).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
See, e.g., ALBERT H. CANTRIL & SUSAN DAVIS CANTRIL, READING MIXED SIGNALS: AM-

BIVALENCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT GOVERNMENT 10-18 (1999); NAT'L COMM'N
ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR A1MERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC SERVICE 73-76

(1989); WATTENBERG, supra note 146, at 107.
227 See supra note 146; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., supra note 226, at
75-76 (reviewing surveys that reveal public support for government taking responsibility
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While distrust of government has been part of the American character from the Founding, current citizen reaction is unprecedentedly
negative. 228 The contemporary American love-hate relationship with
the regulatory state has at least two consequences that make it more
difficult to improve the performance of regulatory government.
Most immediately, it has encouraged the growth of the late twentieth-century sport of "bureaucrat bashing." Public administration
scholars have expressed concern about what an increasingly shrill and
pervasive atmosphere of antigovernment rhetoric does to the morale,
performance, and recruiting of government officials.2 29 Lack of public esteem for and confidence in the work of public officials has been
identified as a significant causal component of a "'quiet' crisis" in the
quality of government service. 230 The casualties of this barrage of very
vocal distrust and disrespect may include more than 'Just" morale and
job satisfaction. Lawrence Mitchell, drawing on Adam Smith, David
Hume, and Aristotle, has recently argued that "when we deprive people of the experience of being trusted," we decrease the likelihood of
their behaving in a trustworthy fashion. 23 1 "iT] he moral psychology
of being trusted itself helps to create trustworthiness in people
....

232 This argument is, of course, consistent with the basic psycho-

logical phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy. And, indeed, social science literature provides evidence from a variety of contexts to
support the hypothesis that decision'makers who believe they are
233
trusted behave in a more trustworthy fashion-and vice versa.
for major social and economic issues and condemnation of government as inefficient and
wasteful); cf JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: Moons, CYCLES AND SWINGS
127 (2d ed. 1999) (noting the dissonance between the electoral success of 1994 congressional candidates running on the conservative Contract with America platform and public
unwillingness to support "sharp attacks" on programs such as environmental and securities
regulation).
228 See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 47 (reporting survey data that, in the 1990s,
about 75% of Americans "didn't trust the government to do what is right most of the time";
also, contrasting 1966 survey, in which 66% of Americans reected the statement "the people
running the country don't really care what happens to you," with 1997 response, in which
57% accepted this statement).
229 See, e.g., Bruce Adams, The Frustrationsof Government Service, 44 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5
(1984); Yuan Ting, Determinants ofJob Satisfaction of Federal Government Employees, 26 PUB.
PERSONNEL MGMT. 313 (1997); Patricia A. Wilson, Power, Politics, and Other Reasons Why Senior Executives Leave the Federal Government, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 12 (1994).
230 Ting, supra note 229, at 313; see, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., supra note
226, at xviii, 13, 59-60, 64-65; see also Adams, supra note 229, at 6 ("If negative public
attitudes are to continue to reinforce unattractive job situations, the best of present and
prospective public officials will be lost to government service for decades to come.").
231 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REv. 591, 600
(2001).
232 Id. at 599; accord Simon Blackburn, Trust, Cooperation, and Human Psychology, in
TRUST AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 216, at 28.
233 E.g., John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Trust and Compliance, 4 POLICING & SoC'v 1
(1994) (nursing home administrators in Australia). As John Braithwaite puts it, the re-
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More deeply, the contemporary public tendency to demand regulation while condemning regulatory government threatens to trap us
in a state of chronic democratic discontent. The work of political psychologist Tom Tyler and others reveals that, especially in democracies, the effectiveness of political and legal authorities depends heavily
upon "the willing, voluntary compliance of most citizens." 234 Such cooperation, in turn, rests in significant part upon "people's feeling that
they ought to obey the law," and the "central factor" in producing that
feeling is "trust in the motives of authorities." 235 Moreover, the level
of such trust can influence how citizens evaluate the performance of
authorities.23 6 Political scientist Marc Hetherington has found empirical support for the hypothesis that low levels of political trust function
as cause, as well as effect, of negative assessments of government performance. Examining citizen trust data from the National Election
Study in conjunction with a variety of social and economic factors,
Professor Hetherington observed that "decreasing trust leads to substantially more negative evaluations of both the incumbent president
and Congress as a political institution, as well as the reverse." 237 Spesearch reveals "ageneral characteristic of trust that distinguishes it from most other assets
studied by social scientists: Trust is not a resource depleted through use. In fact, trust is
depleted through not being used." John Braithwaite, InstitutionalizingDistrust, Enculturating Trust, in TRusT AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 216, at 343, 347; see Albert 0. Hirschman,
Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of ComplicatingSome CategoriesofEconomic Discourse, 74 AM.
EcoN. REV. 89, 93-95 (1984).
Some of the most intriguing work in this area comes from economists employing typical rational choice methodologies to reach novel conclusions about the existence and role
of trustworthiness in political and social life. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 216 (modeling
representative politics to argue that democratic electoral processes can both affect individual incentives to develop trustworthiness and allocate such trustworthiness as there is to its
highest social use: i.e., to government); Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIvE RELATIONS 49, 56-59 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988)
(mathematically modeling the phenomenon of "self-fulfilling expectations about honest
and dishonest behavior").
234 Tom R.Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A PoliticalPerspective 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 847,
856, 858-59, 867-69 (1998).
235
Id. at 858-59, 866-67. See also PtrrNA , supranote 222, at 347-38 (reporting studies
that voluntary compliance with tax laws is higher among people who view others as honest
and who trust government); Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in OrganizationalAuthorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTnERS OF THEORY & RESEARCH 331, 332 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R.Tyler
eds., 1996) (presenting empirical evidence "that people's evaluations of the trustworthiness of organizational authorities shape their willingness to accept the decisions of authorities as well as influencing feelings of obligation to follow organization rules and laws").
236
See Tyler, supra note 234, at 867. See generallyARMIN FALK ET AL., TESTING THEORIES
OF FAiRNESS---INTENrONS MAIrER (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich,
Working Paper No. 63, 2000) (finding empirical support for the proposition that people's
assessment of the fairness of a decision depends not only on the substantive outcome but
also on their assessment of the decisionmaker's intentions), availableat http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=259263.
237 Marc J. Hetherington, The PoliticalRelevance of Political Trust, 92 Amt. POL. SCi. REV.
791, 794-97 (1998).
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cifically, "[r]ather than simply reflecting dissatisfaction with incumbents and institutions, declining political trust contributes to this
dissatisfaction, creating an environment in which it is difficult for
238
those in government to succeed."
In sum, the erosion of citizens' faith in the people who govern
them represents the loss of a significant social resource. 239 To be
sure, legal scholars would have to be more than usually egoistic to
assume that negative public attitudes toward government are traceable to academic theorizing-as contrasted with news media that hypes
the negative and controversial, interest groups that tell hyperbolic
horror stories to further a particular regulatory (or deregulatory)
agenda, candidates who run for government office on an antigovern238 Id. at 791; accord PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 347 ("It is commonly assumed that
cynicism toward government has caused our disengagement from politics, but the converse
is just as likely: that we are disaffected because as we and our neighbors have dropped out,
the real performance of government has suffered."); see also Braithwaite, supra note 233, at
349 ("Once the fabric of trust unravels, a society suffers in two ways-from abuse of power
and from a want of the confidence necessary for a flourishing economy."); Tyler & Degoey,
supra note 235, at 345 ("[B] eing trusted by others appears to be a valuable social resource
that gives authorities a 'cushion of support' during difficult times.").
239 With his customary eloquence, our colleague Jon Macey argues that fomenting cynicism about government will have the salutary effect of encouraging Americans to look to
the private sector, rather than government, to solve social and economic problems. See
Macey, supra note 128. It appears, however, that neither large corporations nor nonprofit
organizations-the two types of entities most likely to dominate a regime of privatized
regulatory problem solving-have escaped the problem of declining trust.
Both a CNN/USAToday/Gallup poll conducted June 8-10, 2001 and a Harris Poll
conducted in January 2001, found that "major companies" (or "big business") effectively
tied Congress in public confidence ratings; in each case, the slight edge business seemed to
have was within the poll's margin of error. Perhaps more significantly, big business appears
to be losing ground as compared with Congress. Analogous figures from the January 2000
Harris poll had shown corporations running thirteen percentage points ahead of Congress. Indeed, the series of Harris Polls from 1998 shows public confidence in Congress
and in "the executive branch of the federal government" steadily improving while confidence in major companies has reached its lowest point in four years. In a Newsweek Poll
conducted June 29-30, 2000, Congress and the White House actually received higher confidence ratings than major corporations (32% and 31% vs. 24%; margin of error 4%). All
of these polls are available at http://wwv.pollingreport.com/instituthtm.
With respect to nonprofit organizations, the news is more positive but also more
complex. Biennial polls taken by the Independent Sector throughout the 1990s report
rising confidence levels in charitable organizations generally, but decreasingconfidence in
how charities use donated funds. See Indep. Sector, PublicAttitudes Toward Charitable Organizations (1999), at http://vv.independentsector.org/gandv/s-publ.htm. The percentage believing that "most" charities are "wasteful" in using funds rose from 26% in 1990 to
32% in 1999 (although the latter number is down from a high of 38% in 1994). Taking the
Pulse ofAmericans'Attitudes Toward Charities,FACTS & FINDINGS (Indep. Sector, Wash., D.C.),
Spring 2001, at 4, at http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/
factfind3.pdf. The percentage believing that "most" charities are "honest and ethical" in
their use of funds dropped from 71% in 1990 to 60% in 1996, id., a slight apparent rise of
confidence in the 1999 poll was within the poll's margin of error, see Indep. Sector, Methodology and How to Interpret Survey Data (1999), at http://vw.independentsector.org/gandv/
s meth.htm.
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ment platform, or some larger social malaise that infected Americans
after Vietnam. Still, unless legal scholarship is going to be dismissed
as a solipsistic enterprise in which the participants talk only to each
other, academics must accept some responsibility for shaping the prevailing cultural story of what regulatory government is about, how well
it is accomplishing its mission, and why it sometimes fails to advance
the public welfare. Whether intentionally or not, "public choice
talk" 240 has given an intellectual imprimatur to bureaucrat bashing,
and an aura of scientific certainty to the assertion that government
"causes more problems than it solves.1241 As Bruce Adams, former
director of the Office of Personnel Management and dean of two
prominent schools of public administration, has observed: "[A]mong
elites, cynicism toward government has become, in a perverse way, a
242
mark of cultivation."
Describing the value and the limits of theoretical models, John
Braithwaite points out that "[t]heories of institutional design are useful as metaphors that supply competing ways of imagining changes in
direction for social policy. They are rarely useful in supplying eternally true sets of propositions." 243 We do not claim that the cognitive
model ineluctably generates an exhaustive and determinate set of
specifications for designing perfect regulatory institutions. We do suggest that it offers a new set of metaphors for understanding the vulnerabilities, and the capabilities, of public policymaking processes.
Political scientist Peter DeLeon's examination of the history of the
policy sciences in relation to the theory and practice of American democracy ends by expressing concern that "the analytic priesthood is
doing little to discourage the ebbing of American's faith in government and, by extension, the democratic system."' 244 If legal theory is

not to merit this same criticism, it must find ways of thinking about
government that are pragmatically optimistic: i.e., ways which do not
deny the presence of self-interest and ambition, but which refuse to
place such motivation at the center of civic behavior; ways which willingly acknowledge that regulatory failures occur, but which evaluate
failure claims with the open-minded determination to understand and
learn rather than the gleeful anticipation of being able to say "I told
you so!" The cognitive model, we believe, represents one such way.
The phrase is Jerry Mashaw's. See MAsSAW, supra note 5, at 28.
See supra note 146. For an early and eloquent expression of concern about the
social costs of public choice talk, see Steven Kelman, "PublicChoice" and Public Spirit, 87
PuB. INT. 80, 93-94 (1987); cf.John Ferejohn, It's Not Just Talk, 85 VA. L. Rxv. 1725, 1727
(1999) (discussing reality and substantiality of such "discourse effects"); Pamela S. Karlan,
Politicsby Other Means, 85 VA. L. REv. 1697 (1999) (identifying costs of using market metaphors to analyze electoral processes).
242
Adams, supra note 229, at 6.
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Braithwaite, supra note 233, at 365.
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PETER DELEON, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLCY SCIENCES 100 (1997).
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